

ASIA DIALOGUE  
ON  
**FORCED  
MIGRATION**

FIFTEENTH MEETING

Le Méridien, Jakarta, Indonesia

23-24 June 2026

Participant Pack



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**Welcome to Jakarta for the 15th meeting of the Asia Dialogue on Forced Migration (ADFM). This meeting takes place on 23-24 June 2026 at the Le Méridien Hotel.**

We are delighted to return to Jakarta for our 15th ADFM Meeting. Our last ADFM Meeting was held in August 2025 in Bangkok, and focused on the impact of cuts to refugee funding and resettlement programs, and what that may mean for those displaced in the region, hosting countries, and risks of exploitation for vulnerable migrants. Recommendations from that meeting included prioritising civil registration and documentation for people with irregular status, developing local labour opportunities linked with mobility pathways and scaling involvement of the private sector. Significantly the Thai Government introduced a policy to allow refugees in the camps on the Thai-Myanmar border to work legally the week after this meeting.

Since then the ADFM Secretariat has been active both regionally and nationally. We formally briefed AICHR Representatives about the recommendations in *From Crisis to Collaboration*, and participated in an ACWC validation session for draft ASEAN guidelines on alternatives to detention of children. In Indonesia we have worked in coalition to develop ideas for a revised Presidential Regulation on the Handling of Refugees, which covers issues of refugee registration and access to livelihoods.

Now, one year on from the major funding cuts and as impacts are really starting to be felt, we convene the 15th ADFM meeting in Jakarta. The meeting also takes place during a time of war in the Middle East, whose personal, political and economic effects are being felt across Southeast Asia.

This meeting will continue discussions from last year on the impact of funding and resettlement cuts, and how to transition to more sustainable models of forced migration governance at the national and regional level. Jakarta is a natural host for these discussions given it is the home of the ASEAN Secretariat and Co-Chair of the Bali Process.

We look forward to focusing our attention on two areas:

1. Livelihoods opportunities for people with irregular status, refugees and those at risk of trafficking to prevent risks of exploitation;
2. Opportunities to improve regional collaboration and responsibility-sharing, including the role of ASEAN, the Bali Process, and ASEAN Dialogue Partners.

Please find enclosed the full participant pack, which includes meeting agenda, participant list, discussion paper, and profiles of participants and partner organisations. Thank you to all who contributed in reviewing the discussion papers.

ADFM Meetings are not about admiring the problem, but rather are opportunities to develop practical, workable policy options to the forced migration challenges facing our region. As always we encourage participants to bring their curiosity, creativity and collegiality to the meeting.

We look forward to seeing you soon.

Best wishes,



**Andrew Hudson**  
Centre for Policy  
Development



**Tri Nuke Pudjiastuti**  
National Research and  
Innovation Agency



**Sriprapha Petcharamesree**  
Faculty of Law,  
Chulalongkorn University



**Thomas Daniel**  
Institute of Strategic &  
International Studies

## Agenda: ADFM 15th Meeting

Day 1 – Tuesday 23 June 2026

<u>Time</u>	<u>Topic</u>	<u>Additional Information</u>
8:30-9:00	Arrival	Registration, tea and coffee provided
9:00-9:30	Welcome, recap of last meeting and ADFM's activities	Plenary discussion: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opening remarks and welcome of new participants</li> <li>• Overview of agenda and objectives of the meeting</li> <li>• Welcome of new ADFM Secretariat partner</li> </ul>
9:30-10:30	<u>Session 1:</u> Setting the scene	Setting the scene – updates from roundtable participants on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Update on impact of recent aid cuts for camp-based refugees around the region</li> <li>• Update on impact of recent aid cuts for refugees in Indonesia</li> <li>• Regional priorities from ASEAN and the Bali Process</li> </ul>
10:30-11:00	Morning tea	Refreshments provided
11:00-12:30	<u>Session 2:</u> Deep dive: Recent migration policy developments in Thailand	Thai colleagues share recent developments around: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legalising work for camp-based refugees living at the border: implementation progress, challenges, opportunities.</li> <li>• Introduction of registration cards for camp-based refugees.</li> <li>• Rationale and goals for longer-term migration policy reform.</li> </ul> <p>Plenary discussion: opportunity to ask questions and reflect on lessons applicable to other country contexts.</p>
12:30-1:30	Lunch break	Lunch provided
1:30-3:00	<u>Session 3:</u> Livelihood opportunities for people with irregular status and those at risk of trafficking	Plenary discussion: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Recap key take-aways from Thailand deep dive</li> <li>• Hear from other countries and the private sector on related developments</li> <li>• Discuss ways of addressing risks of exploitation as part of livelihoods policies</li> </ul> <p>Small group discussions to dive deeper into ideas for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Designing livelihoods opportunities that benefit both national economies and those with irregular status.</li> <li>• Bringing government and the private sector together to pursue this agenda.</li> <li>• Linking in-country livelihoods and training programs with resettlement and other migration pathways.</li> </ul>
3:00-3:30	Afternoon tea	Refreshments provided
3:30-5:00	<u>Session 3</u> (continued)	Plenary discussion: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Report back on recommendations from group discussions</li> <li>• Agree priority recommendations to take forward</li> </ul>
5:00-6:30	Break	<i>Bus to dinner departs Le Meridien at 6pm from the lobby.</i>

6:30-8:30	ADFM Dinner	Venue: Bungarampai Restaurant Guest speakers: Hon. Mercy Barends MP and Ambassador Jane Duke
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Day 2 – Wednesday 24 June 2026

<u>Time</u>	<u>Topic</u>	<u>Additional Information</u>
9:00-11:00	<u>Session 4:</u> Responsibility-sharing and the role of ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners	For discussion: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kick off speaker presents the paper and key recommendations</li> <li>• Feedback and open discussion on recommendations</li> <li>• Confirmation of which proposals to take forward</li> </ul>
11:00-11:30	Morning tea	Refreshments provided
11:30-1:00	<u>Session 5:</u> Zooming out: the future of responsibility- sharing	For discussion: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kick off speaker shares emerging research on the future of responsibility sharing</li> <li>• Moderated discussion about the ideas and particular priorities for the Asia Pacific region</li> </ul>
1:00-2:00	Lunch	Lunch provided
2:00-3:00	<u>Session 6:</u> Discussion and confirmation of proposals	Recap and agree proposals to take forward related to (indicative): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advancing livelihoods opportunities for those with irregular status</li> <li>• The role of the private sector in supporting livelihoods opportunities</li> <li>• Regional cooperation and responsibility sharing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The role of ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners</li> <li>○ Alignment between ASEAN &amp; Bali Process agendas</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Longer-term options for the future of responsibility-sharing</li> </ul>
3:00-3:30	Summary and closing remarks	Closing and confirmation of next steps
3:30 onward	Guests depart	


## Participant List (alphabetical)

Name	Organisation	Country
Abie Sancaya	National Programme Officer, <b>United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC)</b>	Indonesia
Adhi Setya Perkasa	Assistant Deputy for Coordination of Transnational Crime and Extraordinary Crimes, Daily Chair of the National Refugee Protection Task Force, <b>Coordinating Ministry of Politics and Security</b>	Indonesia
Andrew Hudson	Chief Executive Officer, <b>Centre for Policy Development</b>	Australia
Andy Dwyer	First Secretary (Immigration), <b>Department of Home Affairs, Australian Embassy Jakarta</b>	Australia
Anita Wahid	Indonesia Representative to the <b>ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)</b>	Indonesia
Asrul Shuhada binti Mohd Salleh	Deputy Division Secretary, <b>Ministry of Home Affairs</b>	Malaysia
Charlene Calingasan	State Counsel, <b>Department of Justice</b>	Philippines
Chawaratt (Mic) Chawarangkul	Asia Pacific Regional Manager, <b>International Detention Coalition</b> , Co-founder of <b>Thailand Migration Reform Consortium</b>	Thailand
Chompunut Phasuphan	Department of International Organisations, <b>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</b>	Thailand
Chunya Primrose Boonyawan	Lecturer, Faculty of Law, <b>Chulalongkorn University</b>	Thailand
Dewi Fortuna Anwar	Research Professor, Research Center for Politics, <b>National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN)</b>	Indonesia
Edmund Bon Tai Soon	Malaysian Representative to the <b>ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)</b>	Malaysia
Elizabeth Collett	Global Fellow, <b>Migration Policy Institute</b>	International
Ervina Pransiska Rindu Pratiwi	Head of Division, <b>Caregiver Indonesia</b>	Indonesia
Hafsar Tameesuddin	Co-Secretary General, <b>Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network</b>	International
Hannah Jambunathan	Asia Pacific Senior Programme Officer, <b>International Detention Coalition</b>	Malaysia
Indah Nuria Savitri	Director for Human Rights and Migration Affairs, <b>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</b>	Indonesia
Jane Duke	Ambassador to Counter Modern Slavery, People Smuggling and Transnational Crime, <b>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</b>	Australia
Jorge Tigno	Professor, Department of Political Science, <b>University of the Philippines Diliman</b>	Philippines
Kartika Budhi Wijayanti	Senior Officer, <b>ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation</b>	International
Karen Whiting	Head of Bureau Protection and Solutions Service, <b>UNHCR Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific</b>	International
Mariam Diakite	First Secretary - Human Security, <b>Australian Mission to ASEAN</b>	Australia
Marweena Manan	Undersecretary, National Strategic Office, <b>Council for Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling (MAPO)</b>	Malaysia
Maushumi Rahman	Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., Embassy of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, <b>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</b>	Bangladesh
Mercy Christy Barends	Member of Parliament, Chair of <b>ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights</b>	Indonesia
Michiko Ito	Deputy Head of Operations, Asia, <b>IOM Mission to Thailand</b>	International
Mohd Zulhairi Mohd Nor	Immigration Officer, <b>Ministry of Home Affairs</b>	Malaysia
Nilima Afroz	Deputy Secretary, Public Security Division, <b>Ministry of Home Affairs</b>	Bangladesh
Nur Asiah Mohd Shariff	Assistant Director of Intelligence & National Crisis Management Division, <b>National Security Council</b>	Malaysia


Preeyaporn Yookong	Plan and Policy Analyst Professional Level, Internal Security Division, <b>National Security Council</b>	Thailand
Sriprapha Petcharamesree	Lecturer, Faculty of Law <b>Chulalongkorn University</b>	Thailand
Tim Chao	Counsellor - Irregular Migration Liaison Officer, <b>Immigration New Zealand</b>	New Zealand
Tri Nuke Pudjiastuti	Research Professor, Research Center for Politics, <b>National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN)</b>	Indonesia
Zcongklod Khawjang	Director of Displaced Persons Policy Coordination and Illegal Migration, <b>Ministry of Interior</b>	Thailand

**Secretariat support & observer**

Caitlin McCaffrie	Policy Director, <b>Centre for Policy Development</b>	ADFM
Christy Kumsan	Senior Project Coordinator, <b>Centre for Policy Development</b>	ADFM
Eros Shidqy Putra	Analyst, <b>Coordinating Ministry of Politics and Security</b>	Indonesia
Faudzan Farhana	Researcher, <b>National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN)</b>	ADFM
Rizka Prabaningtyas	Researcher, <b>National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN)</b>	ADFM



## INVITATION TO ADFM DINNER



The Australian Government  
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
and the ADFM Secretariat  
are delighted to invite you to:

**ADFM Dinner**  
**for the fifteenth meeting of the**  
**Asia Dialogue on Forced Migration**

**Tuesday 23 June 2026**  
**6:30pm-8:30pm**  
(group depart Le Méridien Hotel at 6:00pm)  
Dinner served at approx. 6:45pm  
Dinner remarks at 7:30pm

Venue  
**Bungarapai Restaurant**  
Jl. Teuku Cik Ditiro No.35, Menteng, Jakarta

**Esteemed Speakers:**  
**Hon. Mercy Barends MP, ASEAN Parliamentarians**  
**for Human Rights, and**  
**Jane Duke, Ambassador to Counter Modern Slavery, People**  
**Smuggling and Human Trafficking**

Dress code  
Smart casual attire or national dress

RSVP  
Christy Kumesan: [adfm@cpd.org.au](mailto:adfm@cpd.org.au)

Please advise of any dietary requirements

## Background Paper: Regional Context

The goal of the Asia Dialogue on Forced Migration (ADFM) is to generate improved policy responses to those forms of migration within, and into, the Asia-Pacific region, which are proving the most difficult for governments to manage. These migratory movements - particularly of asylum seekers, refugees and trafficked persons - involve people in the most vulnerable of circumstances and raise complex challenges within national communities.

The purpose of this paper is to provide updates on recent developments in this region as they concern forced migration. It begins with a brief reflection of the progress of trends identified in the 2025 ADFM Meeting. Then it considered issues relevant to the root causes, medium-term impacts, and long term solutions of forced migration, namely:

- Update on the internal situation inside Myanmar,
- Update on humanitarian funding to camp-based refugees in Bangladesh and Thailand,
- Overview of the surge in trafficking for forced criminality across the region,
- Developments at the regional level including ASEAN and the Bali Process,
- Update on resettlement pathways.

### **Reflections on trends identified in 2025:**

When the ADFM last met in mid-2025, global and wide-ranging cuts to aid and resettlement had just been announced, and states were grappling with how best to respond. At the time the ADFM Secretariat prepared a paper outlining three likely trends (in the left column). These trends have proven largely accurate, with a few nuances:

In Aug 2025 ADFM identified the following trends:	Tracking how these have progressed since:
Even without further displacement, there will be increasing pressure on the humanitarian system including refugee camps, urban refugees and internally displaced people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Increasing strain on humanitarian and front-line agencies.</li> <li>✓ Increasing strain on people living in refugee camps, urban settings and who are internally displaced.</li> </ul>
Displaced people are increasingly vulnerable to trafficking, smuggling and related exploitation, and likely increase in dangerous maritime movements and deaths at sea.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Data shows 2026 is emerging as the worst year on record for smuggling routes along the Andaman Sea</li> <li>? One unforeseen development is the apparent rise in mixed movements and increasing number of Bangladeshi nationals caught up in dangerous sea journeys.</li> </ul>
Cuts to funding result in innovative responses from governments and local and international agencies, leading to a better, more cohesive system in the long term.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ We have seen some innovative responses in different countries, including Thailand’s legalising of work rights to refugees living in the nine camps on the border.</li> <li>? It is too early to say whether such innovative national responses will lead to better, more cohesive systems either at the regional level or in other countries.</li> </ul>

### **Myanmar internal update:**

The situation inside Myanmar continues to be tumultuous, with ongoing civil war affecting large parts of the country. UNHCR estimates 3.75 million people are internally displaced as of 4 May 2026, including about 500,000 stateless Rohingya people.<sup>1</sup> UNOCHA estimates 19.9 million people (about one third of the population) require humanitarian assistance, describing the outlook in dire terms: “In the first half of 2025, Myanmar ranked second globally for conflict intensity and fourth most dangerous country for civilians, with

<sup>1</sup> UNHCR Operational Data Portal, 2026, [Myanmar situation](#), 5 May.

more than half of the population exposed to conflict.”<sup>2</sup> According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners there have been 31,059 arrested since the coup, of whom 22,144 are still detained, and 8,061 killed by the junta, including 1,074 children.<sup>3</sup>

In January 2026 the Myanmar military convened ‘elections’ which were recognised as neither free nor fair by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews, Australia, the UK, the EU, Nordic-Baltic countries and others.<sup>4</sup> While Cambodia, Indonesia and Viet Nam each individually sent election observers, ASEAN as a bloc did not, and Philippines Foreign Minister Lazaro has since stated that ASEAN “has not endorsed the three phases of the elections that were held”.<sup>5</sup>

In mid-April 2026, the military released over 4,000 political prisoners including the President deposed by the 2021 coup U Win Myint, and moved Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from prison to house arrest.

### **Humanitarian situation updates:**

Next year will mark a sombre milestone: 10 years since the military-backed violence forced over 700,000 Rohingya people to take refuge in Cox’s Bazar, joining about 300,000 long-term refugees living there. The Government of Bangladesh and the international community have supported this community for all of this time and made several attempts to raise awareness of the ongoing crisis, including through convening High-Level Summits last year. However donor fatigue and ever-expanding global crises have seen the issue stagnate and lose salience in the media.

Elections in Bangladesh in February 2026 resulted in a win for the Bangladesh National Party and new Prime Minister Tarique Rahman. Khalilur Rahman, the former adviser to the Interim Government on Rohingya Issues, has become the new Foreign Minister. So far the policy positions of the government towards the Rohingya crisis appear unchanged.

Cuts to humanitarian funding from the US, EU and others over the past year have led to worsening conditions on the ground. The World Food Programme cut aid provision from US\$ 12.50 to as low as US\$ 6 per person per month as of 1 April 2026.<sup>6</sup> Australia has maintained its humanitarian assistance levels, indeed redirecting humanitarian assistance from elsewhere in the world to focus on the region, so that 75% of Australia’s aid now goes to Asia and the Pacific.<sup>7</sup> However alone it is not enough to address these gaps.

The lack of progress towards creating conditions for safe, dignified and durable repatriation to Rakhine State in Myanmar, and the lack of options for refugees to pursue livelihoods or formal education, have seen an increasing number of Rohingya refugees take dangerous journeys both by land and sea. UNHCR estimates that since 1 January 2022, almost 350,000 people have left Myanmar by land attempting to find safety, and 27,800 have taken sea journeys.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>2</sup> UNOCHA, 2026, ‘[Myanmar](#)’.

<sup>3</sup> As of 27 May 2026: Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma). 2026. [Daily Briefing since Coup](#), 27 May.

<sup>4</sup> Foreign Minister Penny Wong, 2025, ‘[Statement marking five years since the military coup in Myanmar](#)’ 1 February; Council of the EU, 2026, ‘[Myanmar: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the fifth anniversary of the coup](#)’ 31 January; OHCHR, 2026, [Assistant Secretary-General Brands Kehris on Myanmar: Human rights and justice are crucial to resolving this crisis](#), Statement at 61st session of the Human Rights Council, 27 February; Eleanor Sanders, 2026, [UK Statement for the Interactive Dialogue on Myanmar](#), 2 March; Sweden, 2026, ‘[ID on HC oral update on Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar](#)’ 27 February.

<sup>5</sup> What’s In Blue. 2026. ‘[Myanmar: Private Meeting](#)’ 5 March.

<sup>6</sup> Pradipto Vaskar Rakshit, 2025, ‘[WFP cuts Rohingya food assistance: What does losing \\$6.50/month mean?](#)’ *Humanitarian Practice Network*, 21 March.

<sup>7</sup> Penny Wong, Pat Conroy and Anne Aly, 2026, ‘[Investing in our region, resilience and security](#)’ *Press Release*, 12 May.

<sup>8</sup> UNHCR. 2026. ‘[A route-based snapshot: Data and trends for refugees from Myanmar](#)’ 30 April.

Maritime journeys across the Andaman Sea have become the deadliest sea journeys in the world.<sup>9</sup> The most recently recorded tragedy saw only 9 survivors from a boat of nearly 300.<sup>10</sup> UNHCR data shows that 2026 is already on track to exceed the recorded maritime deaths of 2025 with 2,800 people undertaking sea journeys between January and mid-April.<sup>11</sup> Estimates show that about one in seven who attempt the journey don't survive.

Myanmar refugees living long-term in camps on the Thai-Myanmar border have faced similarly severe funding cuts to those living in Bangladesh. In March 2026 the Border Consortium, which has managed aid delivery in that area for decades, announced it would need to end aid provision to 80% of families.<sup>12</sup> Suicide rates in the camps in Tak Province are estimated to be four times higher than among the host community, and there were 8 recorded suicides in just 3 months in Mae La camp (Oct-Dec 2025).<sup>13</sup>

At the same time Thailand has also grappled with conflict on the border with Cambodia, which displaced communities on both sides. Estimates vary, but the Cambodia Development Resource Institute estimates 900,000 Cambodian registered and unregistered migrant workers left Thailand in the aftermath of the border conflict.<sup>14</sup> Thailand's economy is heavily reliant on migrant labour - estimated to be about 10% of the total labour force, and as much as 80% in some sectors and provinces - largely due to an aging population and economic growth of 1.5%.<sup>15</sup> Myanmar nationals make up the largest proportion of migrant workers in Thailand - around 80% of 3.6 million registered with the Department of Employment.<sup>16</sup> In addition to long-term refugee populations living along the border, Thailand has also experienced a newer influx of people fleeing Myanmar since the February 2021 coup. Among this more recently arrived cohort of people is an increase in middle-class and skilled people, which notes a change since before the coup.<sup>17</sup>

A recent study found that the 4.1 million Myanmar people living in Thailand inject an average of 65% of their expenditure into Thai businesses and local communities, with purchasing power of over 221 billion baht (US\$6.77 billion).<sup>18</sup> Another recent study by the Surin Pitsuwan Foundation found a substantial positive economic contribution of recently arrived refugees and migrants from Myanmar into Chiang Mai, Thailand's largest northern city. The study found those who have moved since the coup were more likely to be middle class than prior to the coup, and thereby bring different skills and spending potential. IOM estimates that as of 2025, 4.1 million Myanmar nationals reside in Thailand (about half of whom are in an irregular situation) and that they remit at least US\$ 2.4 billion to Myanmar over the past year.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>9</sup> UNHCR. 2026. '[UNHCR: 2025 was deadliest year yet for maritime movements of Rohingya refugees](#)' 17 April.

<sup>10</sup> Kelly Ng & Sardar Ronie, 2026, '[250 missing after migrant boat sinks in Indian Ocean](#)' *BBC News*, 15 April.

<sup>11</sup> UNHCR. 2026. '[UNHCR: 2025 was deadliest year yet for maritime movements of Rohingya refugees](#)' 17 April.

<sup>12</sup> The Border Consortium, 2025, '[Public Statement: Reduction in food support to refugees](#)', 31 March.

<sup>13</sup> MoFA, UNHCR, CCSDPT, TMR, 2025, 'Multi-stakeholder consultation on strengthening self-reliance for displaced persons' Summary Report, 19 December.

<sup>14</sup> Cambodia Development Resource Institute See also ILO. 2025. '[TRIANGLE in ASEAN Quarterly Briefing Note: Thailand](#)' July-September.

<sup>15</sup> IOM 2026, IOM Thailand Strategic Plan for Cross Border Flows from Myanmar: January to December 2026, page 5; International Monetary Fund, 2026, '[Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and the Pacific](#)', April.

<sup>16</sup> (As of October 2025, IOM 2026, IOM Thailand Strategic Plan for Cross Border Flows from Myanmar: January to December 2026, page 5

<sup>17</sup> Thai PBS World, 2026, '[Myanmar's Middle Class Fuels Chiang Mai's Economy](#)' *The Irrawaddy*, 1 April; Nyi Nyi Kyaw and Sirada Khemanitthathai, 2026, '[Student Migration from Myanmar to Thailand after the 2021 Coup](#)'.

<sup>18</sup> Myo Pyaw, 2026, 'Myanmar migrants in Thailand emerge as \$6.7 billion consumer market' *The Irrawaddy*, 26 May.

<sup>19</sup> IOM, 2025, '[Thailand Response Plan for Cross-Border Flows from Myanmar September 2024-August 2025](#)', p 7.

## Transnational crime updates

The trend of trafficking into forced criminality in scam centres in Southeast Asia continues to attract a great deal of attention, analysis and discussion both regionally and globally.<sup>20</sup> Interpol issued a global warning on human trafficking-fueled fraud in June 2023 which remains in place. This issue was a key agenda item at the latest Bali Process RSO's Constructive Dialogue in February 2026, and Regional Dialogue convened by AICHR Thailand and the Australian Human Rights Commission in April 2026.<sup>21</sup>

The scale of the damage is immense. OHCHR estimates at least 300,000 people from 66 countries have been part of this "scam workforce"; many of whom have been trafficked.<sup>22</sup> In 2023, US\$ 64 billion was scammed globally, of which an estimated US\$ 44 billion was from activities in the Mekong region.<sup>23</sup> In 2024 Australians lost AU\$ 2 billion to scams.<sup>24</sup> While initially these scam compounds were largely based in Cambodia and Myanmar, after a few large scale raids they have since expanded to smaller operations in Laos, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Timor-Leste.

Victim identification in these cases has been inconsistent. Often victims who have been released are not recognised as such, and risk being prosecuted as perpetrators of online scams, or illegal migrants. States without a history or self-perception as 'destination' states, like Cambodia and Timor-Leste, can also lack the infrastructure to support people fleeing the scam centres and what protection and support systems exist can be quickly overwhelmed. This is exacerbated by the current under-funding of civil society and international institutions.

In theory ASEAN could be well-positioned to address these crimes given that the Convention Against Trafficking in Persons is over ten years old and ASEAN Dialogue Partners like Australia have funded tens of millions of dollars worth of anti-trafficking programming over the years. Some promising contributions have been made, such as work by AICHR and the SOMTC in 2025 to produce *Guidelines on the Implementation of the Non-Punishment Principle for Protection of Victims of Trafficking in Persons*, which aim to improve availability and consistency of victim protection.<sup>25</sup> However in practice these crimes continue to flourish.<sup>26</sup>

## Regional and Global Institutional Updates

This year began for the first time with an 11-member ASEAN, after Timor-Leste was formally admitted as a member in October 2025. If all the necessary treaties and protocols are acceded to, Timor-Leste is working towards chairing ASEAN in 2029, following Singapore in 2027 and Thailand in 2028.

2026 sees the Philippines chairing ASEAN under the theme of "Navigating Our Future, Together". The Philippines chose three priorities which all have relevance to the ADFM:

1. Championing peace and regional stability through dialogue... and strengthened cooperation on emerging and non-traditional security threats,

<sup>20</sup> See recent studies: Siobhan Lawler et al. 2026, [Gender, technology and trafficking in persons](#), Australian Institute of Criminology and Bali Process Regional Support Office, 22 April; Office of the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, 2026, [Trafficking into Cyber Scam Operations: Implications for the OSCE Region](#), 17 April; UNODC, 2025, [Inflection Point: Global Implications of Scam Centres, Underground Banking and Illicit Online Marketplaces in Southeast Asia](#), April; GI-TOC, 2025 [The Business of Exploitation: The economics of cyber scam operations in Southeast Asia](#), 19 August.

<sup>21</sup> [RSO 4th Constructive Dialogue; Australian Human Rights Commission post.](#)

<sup>22</sup> OHCHR, 2026, [A Wicked Problem: Seeking human rights-based solutions to trafficking into cyber scam operations in South-East Asia.](#)

<sup>23</sup> US-China Economic & Security Review Commission, 2025, ['China's exploitation of scam centres in Southeast Asia'](#) 18 July.

<sup>24</sup> National Anti-Scam Centre, 2025, [Targeting scams](#), March.

<sup>25</sup> ASEAN Secretariat, 2025, [ASEAN Guideline on the Implementation of the Non-Punishment Principle for Protection of Victims of Trafficking in Persons.](#)

<sup>26</sup> Marika McAdam, 2026, ['Partners in crime? Cooperation against transnational organised crime in the ASEAN region'](#) *ISIS Focus Issue No. 25*, January, pp. 43-45.

2. Building systemic connections towards a shared prosperity through economic integration... that benefits all ASEAN Peoples, and
3. Empowering ASEAN's people by fostering social inclusion, protecting vulnerable groups and promoting a sense of shared identity and community".<sup>27</sup>

At the May 2026 ASEAN Summit, leaders recognised that “minimal progress” had been made towards implementing ASEAN's 5 Point Consensus, and noted that the proposal for a longer-term Special Envoy on Myanmar was still being deliberated.<sup>28</sup> A Leaders Declaration was also signed on Maritime Cooperation, agreeing to 13 actions including to: “Strengthen cooperation in maritime safety and search and rescue, including through capacity-building and developing standard operating procedures where necessary, in accordance with relevant international instruments and best practices as well as strengthen implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on Cooperation in Search and Rescue of Persons and Vessels in Distress at Sea.”<sup>29</sup>

The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime is approaching its 25th anniversary in 2027. This year also marks ten years since the Taskforce on Planning and Preparedness was created alongside the Consultation Mechanism in response to the Andaman Sea crisis, which makes it a worthwhile time for reflection. As noted above, the Bali Process RSO held its fourth ‘Constructive Dialogue’ earlier this year and established a Maritime People Smuggling Response Group within RILON (the Regional Information, Liaison and Outreach Network) which includes representatives from Australia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Timor-Leste.<sup>30</sup>

UNHCR is also celebrating a milestone this year, as 2026 marks 75 years since the creation of the 1951 Refugee Convention. UNHCR will hold a series of dialogues this year exploring different themes related to refugee protection, culminating in a High Commissioner's Dialogue on Protection in December 2026, which will inform an ‘Agenda for the Future of Protection and Solutions’ to be published in early 2027.<sup>31</sup>

### **The state of resettlement and other regular migration pathways**

Refugee hosting countries around the world are still adjusting to the sudden decline in resettlement places seen in 2025. In 2026 Australia welcomed its one millionth refugee formally resettled in the country since 1945. Australia has maintained its resettlement program level of 20,000 individuals, including both offshore and onshore applicants, UNHCR-referred places and ‘complementary pathways’ like community sponsorship and a new small refugee higher education pathway. Since the United States unraveled its resettlement program, a higher proportion of high-needs or complex cases are being received by Australia, which require additional resources.

Other regional countries with small resettlement or complementary pathways programs include Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea. New Zealand has an annual refugee quota of 1,500 places, of which 50% is allocated to the Asia Pacific.<sup>32</sup> The Philippines resettled 300 Rohingya who were stranded at sea in 2015, and over the last few years has created a “CPath” program which has welcomed 25 Rohingya scholars to study at Philippines higher education facilities since 2022.<sup>33</sup> Japan remains one of the largest donors to refugee responses globally, and was the first country in Asia to accept resettlement of refugees. However the numbers remain small, resettling approximately 60 refugees per year from 2020.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Government of the Philippines, 2026, ‘[ASEAN 2026: About the ASEAN 2026 Philippine Chairship](#)’.

<sup>28</sup> ASEAN Chair, 2026, [Chair's Statement of the 48th ASEAN Summit, 8 May 2026, Cebu Philippines](#), para 176.

<sup>29</sup> ASEAN, 2026, ‘[ASEAN Leaders Declaration on Maritime Cooperation](#)’ 8 May.

<sup>30</sup> Bali Process Regional Support Office, 2026, ‘[Regional Information, Liaison, and Outreach Network \(RILON\) Maritime People Smuggling Response Group builds foundations for trusted regional information sharing](#)’ 27 April

<sup>31</sup> UNHCR, 2026, ‘[75th Anniversary of the 1951 Refugee Convention: UNHCR announces year of action and dialogue](#)’ *Announcements*, 13 April.

<sup>32</sup> Immigration New Zealand, ‘[Refugee quota programme](#)’.

<sup>33</sup> UNHCR, 2025, ‘[UNHCR in the Philippines: Five decades of protection, hope and humanity](#)’ 14 October.

<sup>34</sup> UNHCR, 2023, [Global Compact on Refugees Pledge Dashboard](#), 8 December.

The Republic of Korea was the second in Asia to develop a formal resettlement policy, granting about 1,500 asylum seekers refugee status over 30 years.<sup>35</sup>

Concerningly some countries have used Myanmar's sham 'elections' to justify changes to visa policy. In November even before the elections the US revoked 'temporary legal status' for Myanmar citizens living in the US, arguing that conditions were safe to return.<sup>36</sup> In other cases, even countries that have not recognised the elections as legitimate have seen increasingly hostile rhetoric towards migrants generally, leading to more restrictive policies affecting Myanmar nationals. The UK announced an official ban on students from Myanmar, Afghanistan, Cameroon and Sudan travelling to the UK,<sup>37</sup> and Australia has seen a recent increase in visa refusals for PhD students from Myanmar.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Jung Min-ho, 2025, '[Korea's asylum acceptance rate at 2.7% amid 122,000 applications](#)' *The Korea Times*, 3 February.

<sup>36</sup> Will Jackson, 2025, '[US revokes immigration status for Myanmar nationals, points to 'sham' elections as progress](#)' *ABC New*, 25 November.

<sup>37</sup> Esme Kirk-Wade, 2026, '[Visa brake policy: Common questions](#)' *House of Commons Library Research Briefing* 21 April.

<sup>38</sup> ANU, 2026, '[Open Letter to Tony Burke, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, Australian Government, regarding Myanmar nationals refused student visas](#)' 11 May.

## Considerations When Addressing Access to Livelihoods in the Asia Pacific

For refugees living in countries of “transit”, being provided temporary access to employment or livelihoods can literally be a lifeline. In designing any temporary livelihoods policy, it is important to consider economic, community and security considerations.

### 1. Economic considerations: Ensuring both refugees and host communities benefit

- Evidence suggests that the arrival of people willing to work can expand investment and output while accelerating the rate of long-term economic growth.<sup>39</sup>
- Long-term economic benefits to the state include tax contributions, increased spending in host communities, job creation for local populations, meeting unmet labour demand and the elimination of market inefficiencies caused by corruption.
- That said, in areas of already high unemployment, there can be tensions between host communities and refugee communities looking for jobs. Perceptions that providing labour market access to refugees will lead to greater unemployment or lower wages among the host population persist, can be very powerful, and need to be considered and addressed.

### 2. Community considerations: Working in collaboration

- Social cohesion is important for a stable and peaceful society and can be actively fostered through government and non-government efforts.
- One Thai study showed that people living near refugee communities are more likely to have positive perceptions about refugee groups than those living in urban centres.<sup>40</sup>
- Policies that permit refugees to work and live in communities should be communicated clearly to local communities in order to avoid misinformation or resentment.
- Place-based responses, and close collaboration between central and local governments, can make a significant difference in assessing community needs and managing resources effectively.
- Where refugees are living in or near communities with their own economic struggles, designing livelihood policies that benefit both local and refugee groups are much more likely to be effective.

### 3. Security considerations: Ensuring real and perceived security threats are balanced with rights

- Effective management of real and perceived threats can reduce their likelihood and improve community confidence in the management of forced migrant flows.
- People who are not able to legally work can be pushed into working illegally, which can result in high levels of disenfranchisement and poverty, which are not conducive to stable, peaceful societies.
- Regularisation reduces risks of exploitation, trafficking and irregular onward movement. Registration and population surveys can help prevent fraud, improve understanding of population demographics and equip governments to make more strategic decisions in the design of policy and services.
- Regularisation also demonstrates to communities that the government is managing flows of people in an orderly manner, and has the capacity to keep track of who is within their borders.

### Involvement of private sector

In addition to working with refugee and host community groups, working with the private sector will be important to the long-term sustainability of these policies. Some large companies like Lego and Ikea have philanthropic foundations which have invested millions in humanitarian and refugee responses. However it is also important to bring on board local and small and medium businesses, who are the main employers in most communities. Beyond funding, companies also have an opportunity to champion refugee employment and training programs, and also invest in new ways of working. 271 pledges were made by private sector entities at the 2023 Global Refugee Forum, which could form a useful starting point for engagement.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Uri Dadush and Mona Neibuhr, 2026, ‘[The economic impact of forced migration](#)’ OCP Policy Centre.

<sup>40</sup> Malee Sunpuwan and Sakkarin Niyomsilpa, Perception and Misperception: Thai Public Opinions on Refugees and Migrants from Myanmar, *Journal of Population and Social Studies*, vol. 21, July 2012, pp. 47-8.

<sup>41</sup> UNHCR. 2026. [Pledge Dashboard](#).

## Deep Dive: Recent Policy Developments in Thailand

On 26 August 2025 the Thai Government announced it would allow long-staying refugees from Myanmar living on the Thai-Myanmar border to work legally. This policy impacts approximately 42,000 working age adults (of a total of 77,305 living along the border).<sup>42</sup> This policy came into effect from 1 October 2025, and as of June 2026 reportedly 5,500 refugees had found jobs.<sup>43</sup> The UN estimates between 10,000-20,000 stand to find jobs over the coming year.<sup>44</sup> This development came not long after the Thai Government streamlined the process for stateless persons to obtain legal status, first announced in a Cabinet Resolution on 29 October 2024. Nearly half a million stateless adults and children benefited from this process, making it one of the most significant reductions in statelessness globally in 2025.<sup>45</sup>

The 'right to work' policy in Thailand is part of a strategic shift towards refugee self-reliance. Since being announced in August 2025 the government has developed training materials, launched pre-departure sessions and conducted 'training of trainers' programs. Standard Operating Procedures for the policy were reviewed in November 2025.<sup>46</sup> On 15 May 2026 The Thai Ministry of Interior announced a regulation to issue Non-Thai Identification Cards to refugees living in the shelters.<sup>47</sup> These cards comprise a 13-digit identification number, providing a foundation for legal identity and supporting access to formal employment and self-reliance. On 8 June 2026 the first three refugees received these identification cards.<sup>48</sup> The development and implementation of this transitional policy in Thailand is being watched closely across the region to see what lessons may be relevant for other contexts.

Summary of what is known about the policy thus far:

- The policy applies to registered refugees in the 9 temporary shelters established by the government, not 'urban refugees', unregistered refugees, or those living elsewhere in the country.
- Employment options are outlined by the Department of Provincial Administration and include "skilled or semi-skilled occupations" in 43 provinces, including construction and agriculture.<sup>49</sup>
- 'Integrated recruitment hubs' have been set up to connect refugees, employers and government to assist with recruitment and information sharing.
- Health screening is required prior to recruitment, either in the camps or district public hospitals.
- The provision of identification cards will help refugees to open bank accounts and legally purchase SIM cards. Without these it is hard for workers to maintain contact with family and friends while outside the camps, or to send wages back to their families.

Discussion questions:

- *What is going well with the policy so far? What challenges have been encountered?*
- *What elements of the Thai approach may be valuable to apply in other country contexts? What elements may not be?*
- *What safeguards can be put in place to ensure that access to livelihoods policies do not lead to exploitation and forced labour?*
- *How can the private sector be more involved in making these solutions sustainable?*
- *Could the approach in Thailand also be expanded to include other groups of refugees living in Thailand - urban refugees or more recent arrivals from Myanmar? If yes, what would need to be considered?*
- *How is the right to work policy connected to national registration systems, education and health care?*

<sup>42</sup> Thailand Public Relations Department, 2025, '[UNHCR commends Thai Government for allowing Myanmar refugees to work legally in Thailand](#)', 27 August.

<sup>43</sup> Reuters, 2026, '[Thai jobs for Myanmar refugees could show way forward for Asian nations, says UN](#)' *Bangkok Post*, 9 June.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> UNHCR Thailand, 2025, '[Thailand moves forward on historic statelessness resolution](#)' 7 May.

<sup>46</sup> [Multi-stakeholder consultation on strengthening self-reliance for displaced persons](#), p. 20.

<sup>47</sup> UNHCR, 2026, '[UNHCR welcomes Thailand's move to issue identification cards to refugees in temporary shelters](#)', 15 May.

<sup>48</sup> Chattarin Siradakul, 2026, '[UNHCR praises Thailand's Myanmar refugee ID card initiative](#)' *Thaiger*, 9 June.

<sup>49</sup> The Nation, 2026, '[DOPA clarifies legal work plan for Myanmar displaced nationals](#)' *The Nation*, 11 June.

## Responsibility-Sharing: The Role of ASEAN and Its Dialogue Partners

### 1. Forced migration in Southeast Asia: the case for regional action

In Southeast Asia displacement is driven by conflict, persecution, statelessness, environmental stress, and weak protection systems. The ongoing civil war in Myanmar remains a major driver of displacement both inside and across its national borders, and has exacerbated the protracted displacement of one million Rohingya living in Cox's Bazar. Regional dynamics are further compounded by global crises, including most recently the 2026 war in the Middle East.

Despite these realities, policies to address displacement in Southeast Asia remain largely national, fragmented and ineffective. In 2024 the Asia Dialogue on Forced Migration (ADFM)'s report *From Crisis to Collaboration* identified how existing mechanisms and processes within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can be leveraged to better address forced migration. This paper attempts to expand on that by outlining how ASEAN's partners can support this agenda.

In 2025 ASEAN adopted its *ASEAN Community Vision 2045* which commits to "building a resilient, innovative, dynamic, people-centred ASEAN" that is "empowered in responding to future crises and long-term challenges."<sup>50</sup> The Vision identifies 17 "megatrends" that will shape ASEAN's future including migration, widening development gaps, climate change, natural disasters, and the inclusion of vulnerable and marginalised groups. It also calls for stronger institutional capacity, greater cross-pillar and cross-sectoral coordination, and more effective responses to urgent and complex challenges.

The Vision lays out an ASEAN that is "a caring Community that will ensure the full potential and improve the quality of life for its peoples that is participative, inclusive, sustainable, and promotes social cohesion, hereby ensuring shared prosperity, especially among vulnerable groups, and *leaving no one behind*."<sup>51</sup>

Against this backdrop, forced migration should be understood as a cross-cutting regional challenge that intersects many of ASEAN's stated priorities, including labour mobility, trafficking in persons, disaster response and social cohesion. As ASEAN seeks to address the opportunities and challenges associated with increasing migration and the inclusion of vulnerable and marginalised groups, ensuring that refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other displaced populations are not overlooked will be crucial to fully realising the Vision's goal of "leaving no one behind".

The ADFM's 2024 report *From Crisis to Collaboration* highlighted that ASEAN already has a range of mechanisms and cooperation frameworks that can contribute to addressing forced migration, including those relating to human trafficking, labour migration, maritime cooperation, disaster management, and human rights. The challenge is therefore not the absence of regional architecture, but rather how existing mechanisms can be better connected, coordinated, and leveraged to respond to displacement in a manner consistent with ASEAN's own long-term vision.

Strengthening protection for displaced populations is therefore not separate from the ASEAN Community Vision 2045, but a practical contribution to advancing goals of resilience, inclusion, social cohesion, and effective regional cooperation.

As of 2025, ASEAN Member States officially host approximately 237,000 registered refugees, 66,000 asylum seekers, 3.6 million internally displaced persons, and 1.4 million stateless individuals.<sup>52</sup> These official

<sup>50</sup> ASEAN, 2025, [ASEAN Community Vision 2045: "Resilient, Innovative, Dynamic, and People-Centred ASEAN"](#), adopted at the 46th ASEAN Summit, May 26.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

<sup>52</sup> UNHCR, 2026, [Refugee Data Finder](#), March 2026. Unofficial numbers are likely much higher.

numbers do not include unregistered refugees and irregular migrants. For example, IOM estimates around 4.6 million Myanmar nationals were living in Thailand as of September 2025, of whom about 40% were estimated to be in “irregular situations”, of whom some would be expected to have protection concerns.<sup>53</sup> The vast majority of those internally displaced are inside Myanmar itself, which continues to experience civil war and is still grappling with the impacts of the 2025 earthquake. The number of unregistered refugees is estimated to be far higher.

Refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar comprise the vast majority of registered refugee populations in ASEAN, accounting for approximately 90% in Malaysia<sup>54</sup> and 94% in Thailand.<sup>55</sup> These movements also affect countries outside ASEAN: more than one million Rohingya refugees live in protracted exile in Bangladesh, and an estimated 40,000 live in India.

Part of the reason ASEAN has been reluctant to address refugee issues is the norms of “consensus” and “non-interference” as laid out in the ASEAN Charter. However in the face of ongoing violence, more and more actors are making the case for a norm of “non-indifference”.<sup>56</sup> To address the situation in Myanmar, ASEAN Leaders agreed to a ‘5 Point Consensus’ in 2021 and have appointed a Special Envoy on Myanmar which rotates each year. While imperfect, the Consensus is a milestone point of agreement among all members on how to resolve the conflict in Myanmar. Until the conflict is resolved and democracy is returned to the people, it is not safe for those displaced to return.

In the meantime displaced people are living in limbo. Those hosting the largest numbers of refugees are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and that is not likely to change anytime soon.<sup>57</sup> While some countries have nevertheless taken positive practical steps to improve refugee protection on their soil, without national consistency or a regional protection framework, responses remain largely ad hoc. This places pressure on frontline states, which has only worsened following a drastic decline in international funding for refugee responses globally in 2025-26. These conditions work together to increase risks related to human trafficking and maritime safety of vulnerable people.

The latest UNHCR statistics show that 2025 was the deadliest year on record for Rohingya refugees travelling by boat across the Andaman Sea.<sup>58</sup> In April 2026 UNHCR reported a boat carrying over 250 Bangladeshi and Rohingya individuals capsized, leaving only nine survivors.<sup>59</sup> These dangerous movements are typically facilitated by smuggling or trafficking networks. They are also increasingly mixed - meaning they involve both refugees, asylum seekers, victims of trafficking, and other migrants, each with different legal statuses and protection needs. The transnational and adaptive nature of criminal networks, combined with overlapping jurisdictions and mandates and inconsistent regional cooperation makes responses to these maritime movements particularly challenging.

Stronger regional cooperation and more coordinated engagement by ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners on these issues would align with all three of ASEAN's Community Pillars:

- **Within the Political-Security Community**, unmanaged forced migration poses risks to border stability, maritime safety, and efforts to combat transnational crime, particularly trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling.

<sup>53</sup> IOM, 2026, Thailand Strategic Plan for Cross-Border Flows from Myanmar: January-December 2026, page 7.

<sup>54</sup> UNHCR, 2026, [Figures at a Glance in Malaysia](#), April 9.

<sup>55</sup> Amnesty International Thailand, 2025, [Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Migrants](#), April 9.

<sup>56</sup> Sebastian Strangio, 2021, ‘[Malaysian FM calls for ‘soul-searching; over ASEAN non-interference’](#) *The Diplomat*, 22 October; Julio Amador III, 2025, ‘[The Philippines’ ASEAN chairmanship 2026: From non-interference to non-indifference](#), *FACTS Asia*, 20 December.

<sup>57</sup> Only three ASEAN Member States are members: Cambodia, the Philippines and Timor Leste, and these states host a negligible number of refugees.

<sup>58</sup> UNHCR, 2026, ‘[2025 was deadliest year yet for maritime movements of Rohingya refugees](#)’ 17 April.

<sup>59</sup> Kelly Ng & Sardar Ronie, 2026, ‘[250 missing after migrant boat sinks in Indian Ocean](#)’ *BBC News*, 15 April.

- **From the Economic Community perspective**, displacement contributes to informal labour markets, weakens labour governance, and creates missed opportunities to harness human capital in a region facing demographic change and labour shortages.
- **For the Socio-Cultural Community**, protracted displacement challenges ASEAN’s commitment to a people-oriented and people-centred community, placing strain on community cohesion and local service systems.

ASEAN does not need to act alone. Over the years, ASEAN has been supported by a range of partners in developing their existing frameworks. Many of these have become formal “Dialogue Partners”, namely countries that engage ASEAN through structured cooperation, with formal work plans and financial support.<sup>60</sup> Engagement with Dialogue Partners spans all three pillars of the ASEAN Community, Political-Security, Economic, and Socio-Cultural, and is institutionalised through formal mechanisms, including summit-level meetings, ministerial dialogues, and senior officials’ meetings.

Dialogue Partner engagement differs from what are known as “Sectoral Dialogue Partners”, who engage with ASEAN on specific, pre-agreed areas, working directly with one or more relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies rather than across all three community pillars. Meanwhile Development Partners focus on providing targeted capacity-building, technical assistance, and development support, with a focus on narrowing development gaps within the region.<sup>61</sup>

**Table A: List of ASEAN Dialogue Partners, Sectoral Partners and Development Partners<sup>62</sup>**

Dialogue Partner	Sectoral Dialogue Partner	Development Partner
Australia*	Brazil	Chile
Canada	Denmark	France
China*	Morocco	Germany
European Union	Norway	Italy
India*	Pakistan	Netherlands
Japan*	South Africa	Peru
New Zealand*	Switzerland	
Republic of Korea*	Turkiye	
Russian Federation	United Arab Emirates	
United Kingdom		
United States of America*		
* also has a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with ASEAN		

As highlighted in *From Crisis to Collaboration*, ASEAN can use its existing cooperation frameworks to address displacement. This report outlines how all 11 Dialogue Partners can support this agenda. It begins by outlining what existing Dialogue Partner support looks like, then proposes six recommended areas to work on. The report concludes with specific opportunities for ASEAN’s two oldest Dialogue Partners: Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand.

<sup>60</sup> Hidetoshi Nishimura, 2017, [Snapshots of the ASEAN Story: ASEAN’s Strategic Policy Needs and Dialogue Partners’ Contributions](#), ASEAN@50 Vol. 1: The ASEAN Journey: Reflections of ASEAN Leaders and Officials, page 315, April 21

<sup>61</sup> ASEAN Secretariat, 2026, [How ASEAN Works with Its Partners](#), 10 April.

<sup>62</sup> [ASEAN External Relations Overview](#).

## 2. Analysis of existing ASEAN & Dialogue Partner cooperation

Dialogue Partners have invested significant political, technical, and financial resources over several decades to support ASEAN's development, integration, and regional stability. While the impact of these investments can be difficult to quantify, they have contributed to some significant regional initiatives and policy outcomes.

For example, Australia's support through the Australia-Asia Program to Combat Trafficking in Persons (AAPTIP, now ASEAN-ACT) has contributed to the implementation of the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP), a rare within ASEAN as it is legally binding across all ASEAN Member States. Another example is the USAID PROSPECT project which ran from 2018–2024 and supported the creation of Regional Guidelines and Procedures to Address the Needs of Victims of Trafficking in Persons to strengthen access to protection and reintegration assistance.

Dialogue Partner support can translate into concrete regional frameworks and operational tools. For these initiatives to be successful over the long-term, it is critical that it is a genuinely shared agenda, and is not perceived as externally driven. Cooperative models where ASEAN Member States lead the agenda, and co-fund alongside Dialogue Partners, would lead to more meaningful ownership and long-term sustainability of policy reform. Cooperation should also not be limited to funding or resource mobilisation alone. Dialogue Partners have useful technical and policy development experience, peer learning and study tours that can benefit ASEAN countries as genuine partners, not only beneficiaries or recipients. Further, raising these issues as regular or ad hoc agenda items in closed door and public discussions would also be beneficial.

### a) Existing cooperation

Existing cooperation between ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners is institutionalised through 'Plans of Action', strategic partnership frameworks, agreements and memoranda of understanding that span the Political-Security, Economic, and Socio-Cultural Pillars of ASEAN. Over time, this has created practical channels for technical assistance, funding support, and policy exchange, and as platforms for addressing complex cross-border challenges.

The following section examines existing areas of cooperation to identify where forced migration is currently addressed, where gaps remain, and where practical entry points exist for more engagement, in line with ASEAN's three pillars. Our analysis has identified six relevant existing areas of cooperation between Dialogue Partners and ASEAN, which mirror the six areas identified in *From Crisis to Collaboration*:

- Migrant worker rights and labour mobility**

Cooperation on migration is most advanced in the context of labour mobility. Dialogue Partners support implementation of the *ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers* through programmes on ethical recruitment, skills development, skills recognition, and labour governance reform. These initiatives aim to facilitate safe and regular migration while reducing exploitation. Extending elements of these programmes to include vulnerable populations like refugees already residing within ASEAN Member States would help to reduce reliance on informal labour markets, which undermine regulatory frameworks and expose individuals to exploitation. This approach is aligned with ASEAN's Economic Community priorities and Socio-Cultural integration goals.
- Counter-trafficking and transnational crime**

Engagement on trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants is one of the most active areas of cooperation, consistently featured across all Plans of Action. Support for implementation of the ACTIP includes law enforcement training, judicial cooperation, developing victim identification

systems, and cross-border coordination. ASEAN's transnational crime architecture, particularly the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) and the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), already facilitates collaboration with Dialogue Partners. Given that refugees and asylum seekers often are caught up in trafficking and smuggling routes, and have unique needs and vulnerabilities, Dialogue Partners can help ASEAN strengthen screening and protection-sensitive practices.

- **Protection of women and children**

Dialogue Partners consistently emphasise advancing gender equality and child protection; an area reflected across all Plans of Action, and aligned with the Women, Peace and Security agenda. These include support for female survivors of trafficking, promotion of women's participation in peace-building, efforts to safeguard children from exploitation, detention and lack of access to education and legal identity. Given women and children are impacted by displacement in different ways to men,<sup>63</sup> programs would be more effective if they address migration dynamics explicitly.

- **Maritime cooperation**

Maritime cooperation is included across all Plans of Action and is advanced through mechanisms such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), addressing maritime security, safety, and disaster response, often involving joint exercises, technical exchanges, capacity-building for search and rescue and humanitarian assistance. Although framed primarily in security terms, these activities are also relevant to managing irregular maritime movements and responding to humanitarian situations involving migrants and displaced persons. By incorporating displacement-related scenarios into existing activities, Dialogue Partners can help enhance ASEAN preparedness for irregular maritime movements that pose both humanitarian and security challenges.

- **Human rights**

All but one Dialogue Partner includes clauses on human rights cooperation in their publicly-available Plans of Action.<sup>64</sup> This typically involves partnerships with the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC). These initiatives support commitments to advancing inclusion and social cohesion, and ensuring that no one is left behind, as laid out in the Community Vision 2045. Refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons and other displaced populations are among those living in vulnerable situations. Ensuring these groups are considered and included within existing ASEAN human rights activities would therefore strengthen the implementation of existing commitments and priorities.

- **People-to-people cooperation**

People-to-people cooperation has long been a cornerstone of ASEAN engagement and is consistently reflected across all Plans of Action. Through scholarships, academic exchanges, technical and vocational education and training, youth programmes, and cultural initiatives, Dialogue Partners support ASEAN's goals of enhancing education, skills mobility, and 'regional connectivity'. These initiatives contribute to human capital development, innovation, and social cohesion, and could also serve to address vulnerabilities associated with irregular migration.

<sup>63</sup> Bali Process Regional Support Office, 2025, '[Disaster and displacement in the Asia Pacific: new realities and challenges](#)', 30 September; Alexandra Peard, 2023, '[Cyclone Mocha makes dire situation worse for millions of women and children in Myanmar](#)' *UN Women Asia and the Pacific*, 22 May.

<sup>64</sup> Russia does not explicitly include this issue in its 2021–2025 Plan of Action, although human rights had been referenced as a cooperation area in its previous Plan of Action.

## b) Gaps and opportunities

The above six areas of cooperation have yielded numerous written agreements, working group meetings, policy guides, capacity building training, and in the case of counter-trafficking a legally binding convention. However, there is still considerable room for improvement.

First, existing Plans of Action fail to take into account the vulnerability of refugees and asylum seekers in the region. Instead, migration is conceptualised through one of two lenses: as an economic phenomenon to be managed through regulated labour pathways, or as a security challenge to be managed through law enforcement. Individuals who exist outside of these frameworks, are rendered invisible within existing cooperation agendas.

This blind spot also limits the strategic coherence of regional responses, for instance:

- Maritime cooperation attempts to save lives at sea but does not incorporate disembarkation, reception and protection screening, or referral considerations for refugees and asylum seekers, meaning boats carrying asylum seekers - particularly Rohingya - continue to be pushed back to sea.
- Anti-trafficking initiatives build victim-identification frameworks, yet these are not adapted to account for people displaced by conflict or persecution, who have particular vulnerabilities, and there is no referral mechanism whereby victims identified in one jurisdiction would be so identified in another.
- Human rights cooperation promotes inclusive access to services but stops short of engaging with legal identity, temporary stay arrangements, or pathways to self-reliance for people lacking formal status.

Secondly, there are questions around the impact achieved through some of these areas of cooperation. For example, Southeast Asia is currently experiencing the worst growth of large-scale, coordinated trafficking in persons in living memory and ASEAN mechanisms appear to be insufficient to address the rapidly escalating crisis.<sup>65</sup> The efficacy of the tens of millions invested by Dialogue Partners into the counter-trafficking and human rights agendas must come into question when faced with this reality. This is particularly true where these trends are affecting the citizens of Dialogue Partner countries: either citizens being defrauded, or as victims of trafficking themselves.

The strength of these decades-old Dialogue Partner relationships should form the basis for frank and honest communication, about evaluating what is working in workplans and what may need to change course. For example, both the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States of America instituted more targeted policies related to addressing trafficking for online scams in late 2025, in response to the escalation of cases and lack of law enforcement.<sup>66</sup> Where existing plans haven't achieved their goals, it is imperative that both ASEAN and its partners take stock of what has gone wrong and redirect future funding and cooperation to be more effective.

What is needed is a deliberate effort to reflect on and align current cooperation frameworks, recognising displacement as a cross-cutting issue. Dialogue Partners can help ASEAN maximise the impact of investments already made, strengthen regional resilience, and respond more coherently to evolving migration dynamics. This will not happen overnight, but can be developed over time.

<sup>65</sup> OHCHR, 2026, [A “wicked problem” - Seeking human rights-based solutions to trafficking into cyber-scam operations in South East Asia](#), 20 February.

<sup>66</sup> The Republic of Korea instituted a travel ban for its citizens to parts of Cambodia known for housing scam centres in October 2025, and the UK and USA jointly imposed sanctions on 146 entities linked with the “Prince Group Transnational Criminal Organization” in Cambodia. See: Jaewoo Park, 2025, [‘South Korea issues travel ban after nationals trapped in Cambodia scam centres’](#) *Radio Free Asia*, 15 October, US Treasury, 2025, [‘US and UK take largest action ever targeting cybercriminal networks in Southeast Asia’](#), 14 October,

### 3. What Dialogue Partners can do now: Practical and actionable steps

#### a) Themes and opportunities

The above areas of cooperation each provide entry points to strengthen protection for forced migrants. The below recommendations build on current Plans of Action and are relevant to any Dialogue Partner.

Theme	Opportunities
<b>1. Protection of women and children</b>	<p><b><u>Consider the rights of all women and children, regardless of status:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Support operationalisation of the <i>ASEAN Declaration on the Rights of Children in the Context of Migration</i>, including by finalising and operationalising <i>ASEAN Guidelines on the Implementation of Alternatives to Detention for Children in the Context of Migration</i> and supporting the development of community-based alternatives to immigration detention for children.</li> <li>● Incorporate displacement into existing Women, Peace and Security (WPS) programming to better address the specific vulnerabilities faced by displaced women and girls and to promote their participation in peace, security, and community resilience efforts.</li> </ul>
<b>2. People to people cooperation</b>	<p><b><u>Include both displaced persons and host communities in existing programming:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Fund and/or co-create pilot programmes within existing labour cooperation frameworks for training, skills recognition and employment initiatives targeting both host communities and displaced persons.</li> <li>● Support the expansion of the Philippines' Complementary Pathways (CPath) programme, which provides scholarships and safe, legal stay arrangements for Rohingya youth, particularly those residing in Malaysia and Bangladesh.</li> </ul>
<b>3. Human Rights</b>	<p><b><u>Ensure displaced persons are considered within the protection of vulnerable groups:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Partner with AICHR to ensure displaced persons are considered within the protection of vulnerable groups. For example by assisting AICHR in conducting a thematic study on the human rights dimensions of maritime search and rescue in ASEAN", as part of Activity 14, Focus Area 5 of its current Five-Year Work Plan.<sup>67</sup></li> <li>● Assist AICHR to create guidelines for promoting access to education for all children regardless of migration status; as well as support AICHR to Identify legal, policy, and administrative barriers affecting access to education for children and adults in the context of migration and document good practice among ASEAN Member States, as part of Activity 8, Focus Area 5 of its current Five-Year Work Plan.<sup>68</sup></li> </ul>
<b>4. Counter trafficking and transnational crime</b>	<p><b><u>Integrate protection considerations into cooperation on transnational crime:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Support capacity-building and training for law enforcement and border officials to better distinguish between traffickers, smugglers, and people in need of international protection, and support the development of oversight and accountability mechanisms where required.</li> <li>● Support the establishment of national Trafficking in Persons Survivor Advisory Councils or Committees, in line with the objectives of the ASEAN Multi-Sectoral Work Plan Against Trafficking in Persons (Bohol TIP Work Plan 2.0). This can ensure survivor perspectives inform policy development, programme design, and service delivery.</li> </ul>
<b>5. Migrant worker rights and labour mobility</b>	<p><b><u>Promote migration opportunities through labour, skills, and education partnerships:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Use the ASEAN Directors-General of Immigration Departments and Heads of Consular Affairs Divisions of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (DGICM) platform to promote dialogue and cooperation on improving migration management using a protection lens, including protection-sensitive approaches to maritime search and rescue and temporary stay arrangements.</li> </ul>

<sup>67</sup> ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) [Five-Year Work Plan 2026-2030](#).

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adapt existing technical and vocational education, training and certification programmes to reach marginalised communities, including refugees and asylum seekers, enabling them to develop skills that support economic participation and self-reliance.</li> </ul>
<b>6. Maritime cooperation</b>	<p><b><u>Strengthening humanitarian maritime responses particularly in the Andaman Sea:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use forums such as the East Asia Summit, ADMM-Plus, ASEAN Regional Forum and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum to advance humanitarian cooperation on maritime governance, particularly search and rescue operations and coordinated responses to maritime movements involving refugees.</li> <li>Incorporate mixed-migration at sea scenarios into existing search and rescue exercises, maritime capacity-building programmes, and regional contingency planning dialogues to strengthen coordination and preparedness in responding to vessels carrying displaced persons, including refugees and asylum seekers.</li> </ul>

### b) Alignment between ASEAN and the Bali Process

Given that all ASEAN Member States and Dialogue Partners are also members of the Bali Process, greater coordination could be achieved through regular sharing of workplans, and reviewing any potential complementarity or duplication. This could be particularly relevant at present in work around addressing emerging forms of trafficking for forced criminality, particularly linked to the rise of online scam centres, which both institutions have active workplans around. Additional areas worth exploring include:

- Bali Process Taskforce on Planning and Preparedness and ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) work together on humanitarian coordination and emergency response, including large-scale movements by sea. Conduct annual joint table top exercises to model safe disembarkation and screening for protection.
- A possible Bali Process Regional Support Office and AICHR joint initiative on human rights-based responses to maritime movements in ASEAN, including a thematic study and regional dialogue, which could work towards creating rights-based Standard Operating Procedures for emergency disembarkation, screening for protection needs and temporary protection systems.
- ASEAN Inclusive Business Forum and the Bali Process Government and Business Forum (GABF) holding a joint session focused on access to employment opportunities for migrants in irregular situations. This could explore ways to regularise migrants as a means of minimising their vulnerability to trafficking and related exploitation, with the ultimate goal of creating a network of Asia ‘Business Champions on Refugee Employment’.

### 4. Country examples: Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand

While the activities in Section 3 are applicable across all Dialogue Partners, this section provides specific opportunities for Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand. As ASEAN’s first two Dialogue Partners, both have long-standing histories of engagement with ASEAN and are now among the countries holding Comprehensive Strategic Partnership status: the highest level of partnership with the organisation.<sup>69</sup> With each having recently adopted new Plans of Action, it is timely to explore alignment with refugee protection.

Both countries are signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and each made commitments at the 2023 Global Refugee Forum, including to: “Support comprehensive protection and solutions strategies in the Asia-Pacific, and support States, including those who are smaller and emerging, to develop and strengthen their asylum systems and protection capacity” and “to champion the enhanced global issuance and acceptance of machine-readable refugee travel documents... [and] to build the technical capability of States to issue and accept machine-readable convention travel documents.”<sup>70</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Hoang, Thi Ha, 2021, [The ASEAN-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: What’s in a name?](#) ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, November 24.

<sup>70</sup> UNHCR, 2026, [Pledges and contributions](#).

## **Australia**

To mark the 50th anniversary of this partnership in March 2024, Australia announced more than AUD 500 million in funding for a range of new and expanded initiatives to support shared priorities and add to the already extensive engagement under the ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.<sup>71</sup> The following recommendations are drawn from existing areas of expertise and known priorities in the Australia-ASEAN relationship, and are aligned with the 23 pledges Australia made at the 2023 Global Refugee Forum.

### **1. Strengthen national asylum and protection capacity**

- Work with interested ASEAN states to design, develop and financially support effective “temporary stay” arrangements for displaced persons, from registration and screening to access to health, education and employment or access to livelihoods.
- Facilitate technical exchanges with ASEAN immigration authorities on registration systems, case management, identity verification, and protection-sensitive screening and referral through existing immigration cooperation mechanisms.

### **2. Strategically link cooperation with resettlement policy**

- Consult with ASEAN on how to sustainably scale up Australia’s resettlement and “complementary” pathways programs, such as:
  - Build on Australia’s Train-to-Hire pilot with Malaysia by expanding similar employment-focused initiatives to other ASEAN states hosting refugees and investing in training infrastructure.
  - Expand scholarship opportunities to refugees residing in ASEAN countries such as through ‘Australia for ASEAN’ and ‘Australia Awards’ scholarship.
  - Scale up eligibility to refugees living across ASEAN Member States to the Refugee Student Settlement Pathway, and work with Member States to expand refugee eligibility to study at higher education institutions in ASEAN countries, which will assist in obtaining pre-requisite qualifications for these pathways.

### **3. Support the implementation of alternatives to immigration detention**

- Work with ACWC and ASEAN Member States to support implementation of forthcoming *ASEAN Guidelines on Implementation of Alternatives to Detention for Children in the Context of Migration*. This could include technical and financial support to ASEAN Member States to develop standard operating procedures, referral pathways, and information-sharing mechanisms, as well as ongoing monitoring and peer-learning.
- Expand immigration cooperation visits with ASEAN counterparts (eg. through DGICM engagement) to include alternatives to detention and community-based hosting models.

### **4. Support greater synergy between ASEAN and the Bali Process<sup>72</sup>**

- Work with Bali Process Co-Chair Indonesia to review alignment between the work of ASEAN and the Bali Process related to trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants to ensure agendas are mutually reinforcing and avoiding duplication. This may include exploring opportunities listed above.

### **5. Addressing statelessness**

- Support peer-learning, research and provide targeted technical and financial assistance to ASEAN Member States to strengthen birth registration, digitisation and legal identity policies, and support regional policy dialogue on these issues under AICHR. These activities could be strategically linked to the above work on alternatives to immigration detention.

<sup>71</sup> Australian Embassy Indonesia, 2024, [Australia and ASEAN celebrate 50 years of partnership](#), Media Release, April 16; [Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership \(2025-2029\)](#), 27 July 2024.

<sup>72</sup> As Bali Process Co-Chair and oldest ASEAN Dialogue Partner, Australia is well positioned to lead in this area.

## 6. Continue to support ASEAN and other regional efforts to end violence in Myanmar

- Support the work of the ASEAN Special Envoy on Myanmar to oversee the cessation of violence, delivery of humanitarian aid and the holding of inclusive dialogue, and support work to develop measurable indicators for the 5 Point Consensus. This could also be reinforced through engagement through the Bali Process and exploring new Myanmar-specific regional initiatives, as recommended by the recent Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs.<sup>73</sup>

### **Aotearoa New Zealand**

Although Aotearoa New Zealand is more geographically isolated from ASEAN than Australia, the relationship is still very significant. Marking the 50th anniversary of Dialogue Relations in 2025, New Zealand began its Plan of Action to implement its Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), and also launched the 'ASEAN–New Zealand Vision Fund', of NZD 25 million over five years (2026–2030) to support that agenda.<sup>74</sup> New Zealand also supports the Women Peace and Security Agenda in ASEAN through the five-year AMPLIFY program, which addresses the disproportionate impact of armed conflict and human security threats on women.<sup>75</sup>

#### **1. Strengthen asylum and protection capacity:**

- Incorporate protection-sensitive approaches into ongoing ASEAN Plus New Zealand SOMTC Consultations and ASEAN-New Zealand Transnational Organised Crime Capacity Uplift Initiative, including technical exchanges on registration systems, identity management safeguards, referral mechanisms, and inter-agency coordination to better manage mixed migration flows.
- Convene parliamentary exchanges and visits between New Zealand and ASEAN Member States to facilitate dialogue on migration governance, protection frameworks, and regional cooperation on forced migration, as agreed in the CSP Plan of Action activity 1.1.4.

#### **2. Advancing education and skills development**

- Utilise the ASEAN-New Zealand Vision Fund and existing development cooperation programmes to strengthen access to education for displaced and vulnerable communities through the Manaaki New Zealand Scholarship Programme.
- Support technical and vocational education and training to build skills and employment opportunities among both host and displaced and vulnerable populations in ASEAN, as in CSP Plan of Action activity 3.2.1.

#### **3. Supporting secure identity systems and machine-readable documentation**

- Provide technical assistance to ASEAN Member States to enhance civil registration systems, including birth registration and identity documentation.
- Support the development and implementation of machine-readable travel documentation and identity management systems to strengthen border integrity, reduce document fraud, and facilitate safe and lawful mobility.

#### **4. Enhancing maritime preparedness and humanitarian coordination**

- Support the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum by contributing to capacity-building and technical exchanges on protection-centred search and rescue operations and humanitarian coordination.
- Promote the inclusion of mixed migration scenarios in maritime cooperation exercises and dialogues, helping ASEAN Member States improve coordination and preparedness for irregular maritime movements that involve refugees and other vulnerable groups.

<sup>73</sup> Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2026, '[Democracy and human rights in Myanmar](#)' March.

<sup>74</sup> [Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-New Zealand Comprehensive Strategic Partnership \(2026-2030\)](#) Government of New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade / Manatu Aorere, 2025, [ASEAN & New Zealand Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Factsheet](#).

<sup>75</sup> The Asia Foundation, [AMPLIFY: About this project](#).

**5. Strategically grow durable solutions and migration opportunities**

- Work with the region to sustainably scale New Zealand’s resettlement and “complementary” pathways programs, including through making community sponsorship a permanent and additional part of New Zealand’s resettlement program, prioritising displaced persons in the ASEAN region.

**6. Address the intersection between displacement, women, peace and security**

- Incorporate displacement into existing Women, Peace and Security programming to better address the specific vulnerabilities faced by displaced women and girls and to promote their participation in peace, security, and community resilience efforts.

**ANNEX A: Dialogue Partner ratification status of relevant international treaties**


Dialogue Partner	1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees	1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees	Convention on the Rights of the Child
Australia	✓	✓	✓
Canada	✓	✓	✓
China	✓	✓	✓
European Union*	✓	✓	✓
India	✗	✗	✓
Japan	✓	✓	✓
New Zealand	✓	✓	✓
Republic of Korea	✓	✓	✓
Russian Federation	✓	✓	✓
United Kingdom	✓	✓	✓
United States of America	✗	✓	✗ (signed not ratified)

\*all 27 European Union (EU) Member States have signed and ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocols and CRC.

## Logistical Notes

**Organisers are not able to cover travel insurance** for participants, and participants are strongly encouraged to look into this option themselves. Further information about logistics and travel are outlined in detail below. If you have further questions, please don't hesitate to contact us at [adfm@cpd.org.au](mailto:adfm@cpd.org.au).

Venue
<p>The Venue of the 15<sup>th</sup> ADFM Meeting is at <b>Le Méridien Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia.</b></p> <p><b>Le Méridien Jakarta</b>                      Jl. Jenderal Sudirman No.Kav 18 - 20, Jakarta Pusat 10220                      Phone: +62 21 2513131</p> <p>The meeting venue will be in the <b>Antasena Room</b> on the <b>1<sup>st</sup> Floor</b>.</p>
Accommodation
<p>Most participants travelling from outside Jakarta will stay at the meeting venue, <b>Le Méridien Jakarta</b>, for the duration of the event.</p> <p>For those being supported by organisers, two nights accommodation including breakfast will be covered. Participants will be responsible for their own additional expenses (i.e. minibar, phone charges, etc.).</p> <p><b>Check-in time is 2pm</b>, however you are welcome to drop your baggage off at any time.</p>
Airport Transfer
<p>Please note that participants are expected to organise their own transport to and from the airport and hotel.</p> <p><b>Taxi option</b>                      The hotel is about a 40 minute car journey from Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (CGK).</p> <p>Airport taxis are a fast and convenient way to get from the airport to the venue and will cost around IDR 220,000-260,000. The airport taxi rank is located outside the arrival terminal, you can follow the sign at the airport. Blue Bird is one of the most reliable taxi companies in Jakarta. Be careful as some other taxis use a similar blue colour. Blue Bird taxi has 'BLUE BIRD GROUP' written on the front window.</p> <p>The ride-hailing apps Grab and Gojek are also available at the airport. You will have to download this app from the App Store/Google Play Store and register an account in order to book a ride.</p> <p><b>Train option</b>                      To avoid Jakarta traffic, participants may also travel from CGK Airport to the hotel via the Airport Train (KAI Airport Train). The journey from CGK Airport to Sudirman Baru (BNI City) Station takes approximately 47 minutes, with trains departing roughly every 30 minutes throughout the day. Tickets cost IDR 85,000 and can be purchased directly at the airport train station, either from ticket machines or counters, as well as <a href="#">online</a>. From there you can take a short walk to <b>MRT Dukuh Atas Station</b> and catch the MRT to <b>Bendungan Hilir Station</b>, located within walking distance of the hotel.</p>



### Return flight

After the meeting ends, it is advised to be at the airport about 1.5 hours before your departure time. Factoring in a 40-70 minute journey from the hotel to the airport, aim to leave the hotel 3 hours before your flight's departure.

### Meals

For those staying at Le Méridien Jakarta, breakfast is included in your accommodation booking on 23-24 June 2026 at the La Brasserie Restaurant at Ground level of the hotel, starting at 6.30am. Lunch and coffee breaks/refreshments will be provided throughout the meeting.

All guests are also invited to the ADFM Dinner on 23 June. Transport will be provided, and details will follow soon.

### Facilities at/ around the Venue

The hotel includes access to an outdoor pool, gym and wellness centre.

Restaurants available at the hotel all offer halal options:

- **La Brasserie Restaurant**, with a buffet selection of international and Asian dishes.
- **Al Nafoura Lebanese Restaurant**
- **NO NA MA Restaurant**: Japanese restaurant with sushi, sashimi, and robatayaki
- **Handi Restaurant**: offering North and South Indian food
- **La Boutique** is a café and grab-and-go outlet for pastries, bread and coffee.

Local attractions near the venue:

- [National Monument](#)
- [National Museum](#)
- [Grand Indonesia Mall](#)

- [Plaza Indonesia Mall](#)
- [MOJA Museum](#)

### Visa

A visa is **not required** for a stay of less than one (1) month **for ASEAN nationals**.

All other foreign travellers are allowed to enter the territory of Indonesia with one of these criteria:

- Obtain a visa ([Visa on Arrival](#) or [Electronic Visa on Arrival](#))
- Foreign nationals who enter Indonesia under the Travel Corridor Arrangement scheme (United Arab Emirates, China, South Korea, Singapore);
- Hold a written permit from a related Ministry or Institution.

Visa on Arrival or Electronic Visa on Arrival:

- Visit the official portal at [evisa.imigrasi.go.id](http://evisa.imigrasi.go.id) and create a new user account
- You can only make payment by Mastercard, Visa, and JCB credit card. The card is not required to be under your name. Make sure your card has a “3D Secure System” and is open to international transactions.
- The Visitor Visa fee is IDR 500,000. Please note that payment via Debit/Credit Card will incur additional fees.
- Foreigners who wish to enter Indonesia must hold a passport with an expiration date at least 6 (six) months from the date of arrival.

**All foreign visitors must submit the All Indonesia Arrival Card online at least 3 days before arrival.** Submit online [here](#).

### Other Information

#### Obtaining a SIM Card (if desired)

You can purchase a prepaid tourist SIM at the Soekarno-Hatta Airport or any major city mall. Always bring your passport for mandatory registration. Prices typically range from \$7 to \$15 USD for 20GB–30GB of data

#### Electricity supply

Indonesia operates on a 230V supply voltage and 50Hz. The most commonly used plug types in Indonesia are Type C and Type F two-pin plugs. Participants are advised to bring their own electrical adaptors if required.



## Participant Profiles



## **Abie Sancaya**

### **Indonesia**

Abie Sancaya is a migration and protection practitioner with years of experience working on issues related to migration governance, migrant protection, trafficking in persons, and the smuggling of migrants. He studied law at Universitas Gadjah Mada, international relations at the University of Groningen, and peace and conflict studies at Uppsala University.

Since 2017, Abie has worked with international organisations and institutions on migration related issues. He currently works with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), where he focuses on trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants.

Prior to joining UNODC, he worked with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and other international organizations. His work focuses on strengthening protection mechanisms for vulnerable migrants, enhancing criminal justice responses to trafficking in persons, and promoting regional cooperation on migration and transnational organized crime.



## **Adhi Setya Perkasa**

### **Indonesia**

Adhi Satya Perkasa serves as Assistant Deputy for Handling Transnational and Extraordinary Crimes at the Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs. In this role he handles issues related to transnational crime and international migration, such as trafficking in persons, terrorism, narcotics, and refugee matters.

Adhi has been an active member of the Indonesian National Police for over 25 years and holds the rank of Police Brigadier General. During his career he has specialised in criminal investigations. He has been assigned to the Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs by the Indonesian National Police since 2017.



## **Andrew Hudson**

### **Australia**

Andrew Hudson is Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Centre for Policy Development (CPD). He has 25 years of experience in public policy, advocacy and senior leadership, working with NGOs, the United Nations, the private sector and government. Andrew joined CPD in June 2021 as inaugural International Director, to build out a new international program for CPD, and became CEO in April 2022.

Before joining CPD, Andrew was CEO of Crisis Action in New York, leading a global team of over 50 people in 11 countries working to build coalitions to protect civilians in conflict. Prior to that, Andrew worked at Human Rights First in New York, as a lawyer in Australia, with UNHCR in Ecuador and with the UN Regional Commission in Thailand. He was also Australia's first Youth Representative to the United Nations. Andrew holds honours degrees in politics and law from the University of Melbourne and a Master of Laws from New York University School of Law.



## **Anita Wahid**

### **Indonesia**

Anita Wahid is the Indonesian Representative to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), serving for the 2025-2027 term. She is also currently a PhD Candidate at the Australian National University in Canberra, where her research focuses on civil society's efforts to mitigate the weaponisation of disinformation in the Indonesian election of 2024.



Anita holds a Bachelor's Degree in International Relations from the University of Indonesia and Master of Arts in Development Management from Ruhr-Universität-Bochum, Germany. Prior to her doctoral research, she was an activist on issues of democracy and human rights, including anti-corruption, religious tolerance, and digital democracy. She has been involved in many organisations working on these issues, and currently still serves as an advisory and supervisory board member for several NGOs, as well as member of Safety and Security Advisory Council for TikTok representing Indonesia.

## **Asrul Shuhada binti Mohd Salleh**

### **Malaysia**

Asrul Shuhada binti Mohd Salleh is an experienced civil servant with an extensive background in public administration. She holds a Bachelor's Degree in Information Technology from Universiti Malaysia Terengganu and a Master's Degree in Business Administration from Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.



She began her career in the Malaysian public service in March 2004 as an Administrative and Diplomatic Officer (PTD). Throughout her service, she has demonstrated strong leadership, professionalism, and commitment in carrying out her responsibilities. In recognition of her outstanding performance and contributions, she was awarded the Excellent Service Award in 2014 and again in 2021. Currently, she serves as the Deputy Undersecretary at the Immigration Affairs Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

## **Caitlin McCaffrie**

### **Australia**

Caitlin McCaffrie is the Forced Migration Policy Director at the Centre for Policy Development, where she has worked since 2018. In this role Caitlin coordinates the Track 1.5 Asia Dialogue on Forced Migration (ADFM) in collaboration with think tank partners in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, and provides policy analysis, advice and research on topics including migration governance, human trafficking, forced migration and refugee resettlement.



Prior to joining CPD Caitlin worked for non-government organisations in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, including the Cambodian Center for Human Rights and Stanford University's WSD Handa Center for Human Rights and International Justice, managing programs on research, education, outreach and trial monitoring of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Caitlin holds a Masters of Public Policy and Management Degree from the University of Melbourne and a first class Honours degree in International Studies from the University of Adelaide.

## **Charlene Calingasan**

### **Philippines**

Charlene Calingasan was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 2013, after which time she spent several years in private practice, gaining experience in corporate, labor, and immigration law. In 2020, she briefly served in the Department of Trade and Industry's legal services before joining the Bureau of Immigration, where she gained significant administrative and quasi-judicial experience involving resolution of visa applications, deportation cases, and the recognition of Philippine citizenship. Concurrently, Charlene served as Focal Person for the Refugee and Stateless Persons Protection Unit (RSPPU), which gave her a nuanced understanding of the intersection between immigration and protection frameworks.



Currently, Charlene serves as a State Counsel I at the Department of Justice. In this capacity, she acts as a resource person for the Department on various legal and policy matters, provides legal advisory services, supports international legal cooperation, and assists with policy review, alongside her functions as a Protection Officer for the RSPPU.

## **Chawaratt (Mic) Chawarangkul**

### **Thailand**

Mic Chawaratt Chawarangkul is the Asia-Pacific Regional Manager at International Detention Coalition (IDC), Co-founder of Thailand Migration Reform Consortium (TMR), and Coalition for the Rights of Refugees and Stateless Persons (CRSP). Mic has held numerous experiences in the humanitarian, human rights, and development sectors in Asia and Africa. His skills in creative strategy and constructive engagement have played a key role in advocating for better policies and practices for migrants and refugees in the region.



In Thailand, Mic has played a significant role in shaping the country's policy to end the immigration detention of children, establishment of the National Screening Mechanism and access to employment for refugees. He has served as a member of two Parliamentary House Subcommittees focused on refugees and irregular migration, where he has championed reforms in Thailand's migration governance. Additionally, he advises the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs, Justice and Human Rights, as well as the Parliamentary Committee on National Security, Border Affairs, National Strategy, and National Reform, providing analysis and amendments to the migration legislative framework in Thailand.

## **Chompunut Phasuphan**

### **Thailand**

Chompunut Phasuphan is the Head of the Migration/Humanitarian Section at the Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She joined the Ministry in 2012 and her first posting was to Dhaka in Bangladesh, which is where she began working on displacement issues. Upon returning to Bangkok, Chompunut served as migration desk officer, contributing to key milestones such as the repatriation of displaced persons, establishment of the National Screening Mechanism, and Thailand's role as a Global Compact on Migration Champion Country.



From 2021 until 2024, Chompunut was posted at the Permanent Mission of Thailand in Geneva responsible for human rights, migration and humanitarian affairs. Her interests include Alternatives to Detention (ATD), asylum systems and overall migration governance. She holds a Bachelor's Degree in International Relations from Chulalongkorn University and a Master's in European Studies from King's College London.

## **Chunya Primrose Boonyawan**

### **Thailand**

Chunya Primrose Boonyawan is a lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University. Her teaching and research sit at the intersection of international law, children’s rights, migration, and human protection. Chunya is especially interested in how law can better respond to the lived realities of children and young people affected by displacement, statelessness, exploitation, and conflict.



Before joining academia, Chunya worked with international non-governmental organisations on refugee protection, legal counseling, child exploitation prevention, human trafficking, and atrocity prevention. She holds an Advanced Studies Degree in International Children’s Rights from Leiden University and a Bachelor of Law from Chulalongkorn University.

## **Christy Kumesan**

### **Indonesia**

Christy Kumesan is Senior Project Coordinator at CPD where she works across the forced migration and just transition portfolios. She is a humanitarian and international development professional with a demonstrated history working for non-profit organisations. Christy is skilled in humanitarian diplomacy, multilateral affairs and policy, project management, organisational development, international relations, partnership development, as well as community engagement. Her professional goals include promoting peace through multi-tracks diplomacy and strengthening multinational collaboration to reach world prosperity and equality.



Christy has more than a decade of experience working in this sector including with GIZ, ICRC, RedR Indonesia, and Humanitarian Benchmark Consulting. She has a Masters Degree in Global Humanitarian Diplomacy from Universitas Gadjah Mada and a Bachelor of Political Science from the same university.

## **Dewi Fortuna Anwar**

### **Indonesia**

Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar is a Research Professor at the Research Center for Politics, National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) and was previously the Deputy Chair for Social Sciences and Humanities-LIPI (IPSK-LIPI) from 2001 to 2010. She is also the Chair of the Board of Directors at The Habibie Center, on the Board of the Centre for Policy Development, member of the Indonesian Academy of Sciences (AIPI) and co-founder of the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia. She has written widely on Indonesia’s foreign policy, Indonesia’s democratisation as well as on ASEAN and regional political and security issues.



Between October 2010 and May 2015, Ibu Dewi served as Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs to Vice President Boediono, and from May 2015 to February 2017 as Deputy for Government Policy Support to Vice President M. Jusuf Kalla. In 1998-99 she served as Assistant Minister of State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs during the Habibie Presidency. Ibu Dewi obtained her PhD from Monash University, Melbourne in 1990, while her Masters and Bachelors Degrees were from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London.

## Edmund Bon Tai Soon

### Malaysia

Edmund Bon is the Representative of Malaysia to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). He is also Head of Chambers (Civil) at AmerBON Advocates. Edmund has been in active legal practice since 1998, with over 28 years of experience working with states, businesses, and non-governmental organisations to promote and protect human rights.



Edmund first served as Malaysia's representative to AICHR from 2016 to 2018, and was re-appointed by the government in 2024. In his current term he leads initiatives on the right to development, business and human rights, environmental rights and climate change, pathways to peace, conflict prevention, management and transformation, and strengthening of ASEAN's human rights mechanisms. He also chaired the Commission during Malaysia's ASEAN Chairship in 2025.

Edmund is a Chevening scholar, holds a Masters in International Human Rights Law from the University of Oxford, and is currently pursuing a doctorate in human rights and peace at the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies, Mahidol University, Thailand.

## Elizabeth Collett

### Australia

Elizabeth Collett is a migration policy expert with more than twenty years of experience working with senior politicians and policy-makers at the UN, EU, and national level. Based in Canberra, she consults for numerous governments and nongovernmental organisations around the world, including foundations, non-profits and UN agencies. She is currently a Global Fellow for the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) and is also working with the Zolberg Institute for Migration and Mobility, New York, to develop the International Panel on Migration; a global network of migration academics.



From 2018 to 2023, Liz served as Special Adviser to the Director General of the UN agency for migration (IOM), overseeing policy and strategy. Previously, she established MPI Europe in Brussels, where she produced evidence-based, practical policy research on immigration, asylum, and immigrant inclusion and convened multilateral discussions across the European Union and its neighbourhood. Prior to joining MPI, Liz worked for a series of research institutes and thinktanks, including the Centre for Strategic International Studies, the Institute for the Study of International Migration, and the European Policy Centre. Liz holds a master's degree in foreign service from Georgetown University, and a bachelor's degree in law from Oxford University.

## Ervina Pransiska Rindu Pratiwi

### Indonesia

Ervina Pransiska Rindu Pratiwi, widely known as Rindu, is a public health professional, midwife, healthcare educator, and training leader based in Indonesia. She currently serves as Head of Training Division and Main Trainer at a Caregiver training institute, where she develops workforce capacity and delivers caregiver education for both local and international participants. With more than a decade of experience in health education, maternal care, and healthcare workforce development, she has led training initiatives involving refugees and migrants from diverse cultural backgrounds.



Rindu holds a Master of Public Health specialising in Health Service Management and has extensive experience in cross-cultural communication, community health, and humanitarian settings. She has contributed to refugee-related programs through collaboration with international stakeholders and is a published author. Her professional interests include migration, refugee wellbeing, health systems strengthening, caregiver workforce development, and the social determinants of health affecting displaced populations.

## Faudzan Farhana

### Indonesia

Faudzan Farhana is a researcher at the Research Centre for Politics, National Research and Innovation Agency (Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional/BRIN), Indonesia. She obtained her LL.M in international maritime law from Swansea University, UK in 2019. Her research interests are on the strategic issues in ASEAN, international maritime law and forced migration. Her latest publications include “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy in Pursuing Human Rights Norms to Combat Trafficking in Persons” in Joko Widodo’s Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Legacy, Book Chapter, co-authored (Springer, 2025); “Developing Regional Norms on Protecting Migrant Fisher’s Rights at Sea: ASEAN Way, co-authored, Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy Vol. 10, Issue 2 (2025); and “Opportunities and pitfalls of refugee involvement in digital work in Indonesia,” co-authored, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (JEMS) Vol. 51, Issue 20 (2025).



## Hafsar Tameesuddin

### International

Hafsar Tameesuddin is the Co-Secretary General of the Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN), a social worker, human rights defender and Rohingya activist. They advocate for the rights of refugees, LGBTQI+ communities, statelessness, gender equality, prevention and response to SGBV and ending child marriages. Hafsar has more than 15 years of experience working with refugee communities, INGOS and NGOS and has served as an interim advisory member of the UNHCR Advisory Group. They are currently an advisory member of the Global Movement of Statelessness, board member at Forces of Renewal Southeast Asia and member of the Board for Azadi Project.



Hafsar’s expertise includes understanding the ground realities of challenges faced by refugees, statelessness and LGBTQ+ communities as someone with lived experience. They are a passionate advocate for power shifting, inclusion and diversity within existing systems. Their work and advocacy are centred on improved prevention and response measures to SGBV, to promote and protect the rights of refugees, stateless people, asylum seekers, and LGBTQ+ communities in the Asia Pacific Region and beyond.

## Hannah Jambunathan

### Malaysia

Hannah Reshma Jambunathan is the Asia Pacific Programme Officer at the International Detention Coalition (IDC), where she works to influence policy change on immigration detention and ATD. Prior to IDC, Hannah worked on gender and child rights, and is committed to building pathways towards systemic change, and a better future for women, children, and migrant/refugee communities in Malaysia.



In Malaysia, she is currently working in close collaboration with civil society and Government stakeholders to develop a community-based ATD policy for children, and she also coordinates a national civil society network to mobilise advocacy towards creating a more open social and political environment towards migrants and refugees. Drawing on her academic research background, Hannah has authored several research reports and policy briefs on the issue of immigration detention and ATD, in particular on the impacts of immigration detention on refugee communities in Malaysia, the intersections of gender and immigration detention, and the critical need to reduce the use of immigration detention for children.

## Indah Nuria Savitri

### Indonesia

Indah Nuria Savitri currently serves as Director for Human Rights and Migration Affairs at the Directorate General of Multilateral Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. In this role, she leads Indonesia's engagement on key multilateral issues including human rights, humanitarian and migration affairs.

Prior to her current position, she served as Minister Counsellor (Political) at the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Wellington (2021–2023), Deputy Director for Civil and Political Rights (2018–2021) and served as Counsellor (Political) at Indonesia's Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York (2014–2021). Her earlier postings include Second Secretary (Political) at Indonesia's Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office in Geneva (2007–2011).

Indah holds a Master of Diplomacy and Trade from Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. She brings over two decades of experience in multilateral diplomacy, having negotiated and built consensus on outcome documents and resolutions on various issues across the UN system.



## Jane Duke

### Australia

Jane Duke commenced as Ambassador to Counter Modern Slavery, People Smuggling and Human Trafficking in August 2025. In this role she plays a leading role in driving international cooperation and close collaboration with partners to strengthen responses to modern slavery, and is also fundamental in promoting Australia's work as Co-Chair of the Bali Process.

Ambassador Duke is a senior career officer with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and previously has served overseas as Consul General Los Angeles, Ambassador to ASEAN in Jakarta and Deputy High Commissioner to Malaysia. She also served as Counsellor (Immigration) at Australia's Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva.

Ambassador Duke holds a Bachelor of Arts (Asian Studies) and Bachelor of Laws (Hons) from the Australian National University and a Graduate Diploma in Legal Practice from the University of Technology Sydney. She is also admitted to the New South Wales Supreme Court as a solicitor.



## Jorge Tigno

### Philippines

Dr Jorge Villamor Tigno is a professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of the Philippines in Diliman. He obtained his doctorate in public administration from the University of the Philippines National College of Public Administration and Governance with a dissertation that examined the deregulation experience of the overseas employment sector in the Philippines.

Aside from doing research on voter education, electoral and political reforms, and democratic attitudes, Jorge has also done work in the following migration areas: the role of civil society actors in global migration governance; migration research directions in Asia; the human trafficking discourse on women; government safeguards for Filipino migrant domestic workers; and the link between Filipino overseas migration and local institutions. Jorge is affiliated with the Philippine Migration Research Network (PMRN) and is currently the editor of the Asian and Pacific Migration Journal (APMJ).



## Kartika Budhi Wijayanti

### International

Kartika Budhi Wijayanti is the Senior Programme Officer of the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (ASEAN-IPR). She joined the Institute in 2021 to oversee overall project development, fund-raising, implementation and monitoring, particularly on capacity-building activities related to topics of priority for the Institute.



Kartika is the focal point at the Institute's Secretariat for Women, Peace and Security (WPS) matters, as well the point of contact for the ASEAN Women for Peace Registry (AWPR) - the Institute's only pool of experts. Prior to this role, Kartika has previously worked at the ASEAN Secretariat, UNESCO Office Jakarta and Tifa Foundation. In commemoration of the 75th Anniversary of the UK-Indonesia diplomatic relations, Kartika was one of the awardees of the Ambassadors' Award under the category of Peace.

## Karen Whiting

### International

Karen Whiting is currently serving as the Head of the Protection Service in UNHCR's Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok. In this role she supports UNHCR country operations in the region in the areas of protection and solutions.



Prior to her posting in the Regional Bureau in Bangkok, Karen worked with UNHCR's country operations in Sri Lanka, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Jordan, the Republic of Türkiye, Iraq, Italy and Ukraine. She also worked on judicial engagement in the Europe Bureau in Brussels and headed the Child Protection and Youth Unit in the Division of International Protection in UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva. She holds a law degree from McGill University in Canada, and speaks English and French.

## Marweena Manan

### Malaysia

Marweena Manan is Undersecretary in the National Strategic Office of the Council for Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants (NSO MAPO), Ministry of Home Affairs of Malaysia. Joining the Malaysian Administrative and Diplomatic Service in 2001, she served in the Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI) until April 2026.



Her key roles at MITI included Senior Director of Strategic Negotiation, Director of the Digital Economy Division, and Director of Investment Policy. She also served as Economic Counsellor to the Mission of Malaysia to the European Union in Brussels. Ms Marweena holds an International Masters in European Regional Integration from the University of Malaya.

## **Mercy Christy Barends**

### **Indonesia**

Mercy Christy Barends is a Member of the Indonesian House of Representatives for the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) representing Maluku since 2014. She is also currently the Co-Chair of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR).



Ibu Mercy has been very active on human rights issues including climate change issues through her work in Parliament, as well as internationally through her work in The Alliance of Parliamentarians Calling for a Fossil Free Future, the Global Alliance for Green New Deal, and Air Quality Asia. She is also a Member of Parliamentary Committee Commission X, responsible for Education, Youth, Sport, Tourism, Arts and Culture.

## **Michiko Ito**

### **International**

Michiko Ito brings over 25 years of experience in migration, development, and humanitarian work, with a focus on the Myanmar–Thailand migration corridor. She has held key roles with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in both Thailand and Myanmar, covering labor migration, migration governance, refugee resettlement, humanitarian response and policy. From 2019 to 2023, she was seconded to the UN Office of the Special Envoy on Myanmar, contributing to responses to Rohingya displacement and the country’s complex crisis. She currently serves as Deputy Head of Operations, Asia and Head of Preparedness, Response and Recovery for IOM Country Office with Coordinating Functions for Thailand and Lao PDR.



## **Mohd Zulhairi bin Mohd Nor**

### **Malaysia**

Mohd Zulhairi bin Mohd Nor has been serving in the Malaysian public service since 1992 as an Immigration Officer. He is currently a Cadre Officer at the Immigration Affairs Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, holding the position of Assistant Director of Immigration.



Over his career, Mohd Zulhairi bin Mohd Nor has gained extensive experience including an overseas posting as Immigration Attaché at the Consulate General of Malaysia in Perth and the High Commission of Malaysia in Canberra between 2007 and 2012. He is an alumnus of the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, reflecting his commitment to continuous professional development and international cooperation in immigration and law enforcement matters.

## Nilima Afroz

### Bangladesh

Nilima Afroz is a government officer and researcher with extensive experience in public administration, policy implementation, and academic research. She currently serves as an Officer in the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh and is also engaged as a Research Associate in projects focusing on public health and statistical modeling. Ms Afroz holds a Master's degree in International Human Resource Management from the University of Greenwich, and a Master of Social Science in Public Administration from the University of Dhaka.



She has completed professional training, including the Foundation Training Course and the Law and Administration Course for civil servants. Her academic interests include public policy, human resource management, governance, and social research. She is proficient in both English and Bengali and has experience in research, administration, and organisational management.

## Nur Asiah Mohd Shariff

### Malaysia

Nur Asiah Mohd Shariff joined the government services in 2009 as a junior officer at the Ministry of Home Affairs, specifically assigned as the desk officer for Multilateral and ASEAN Affairs under the International Division. Part of her task in this role was to conduct analytical studies on international issues and their impact on national security, prepare national reports and provide feedback on issues relating to the security of Malaysia at international fora.



In 2013, Nur Asiah was assigned to the National Security Council as the desk officer for counter terrorism and protective security, before being reassigned to the human security unit in 2017. She is now the Principal Assistant Director, with responsibility for human rights and migration issues. She holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences Degree, majoring in Communication and a Masters Degree in East Asia Studies focusing on refugee management, both from the National University of Malaysia.

## Preeyaporn Yookong

### Thailand

Preeyaporn is a Plan and Policy Analyst at the Office of the National Security Council of Thailand. She is currently working in the division responsible for irregular migration issues. As part of a policy-making agency, she contributes to the development of policies that enable Myanmar Displaced Persons (MDPs) to work outside temporary shelters. These policies aim to promote sustainable self-reliance among MDPs while also helping to address Thailand's labour shortage.



Preeyaporn graduated with a Master of Public Administration from Chulalongkorn University, a Bachelor of Political Science from Ramkhamhaeng University, and a Bachelor of Arts in Southeast Asian Studies from Thammasat University.

## Rizka Prabangningtyas

### Indonesia

R.A. Rizka Fiani Prabaningtyas is a researcher at the Research Centre for Politics, National Research and Innovation Agency (Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional/BRIN), Indonesia. She graduated from the Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia, with a bachelor's degree in international Relations. She obtained her master in International Relations (Advanced) from the Australian National University in 2018. In BRIN, she has been a member of Indonesia's foreign policy research team for ten years, and now actively involved in the forced migration research team. Her research interests are Indonesia's diplomacy and foreign policy, particularly relating to humanitarian, human rights issues, international refugee studies, and forced migration.



## Sriprapha Petcharamesree

### Thailand

Sriprapha Petcharamesree is currently Senior Researcher in the Faculty of Law at Chulalongkorn University, and was previously Senior Lecturer in the International PhD Program at the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies, Mahidol University, Thailand. She is part of the Secretariat of the Asia Dialogue on Forced Migration (ADFM).

Dr Petcharamesree was appointed by the Thai Government as the Thai Representative to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) where she served between October 2009 to December 2012. Her research and expertise focuses on human rights, ASEAN and Southeast Asian studies, migration, including statelessness and citizenship, business and human rights, and international relations. Dr Petcharamesree has a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Thammasat University, Thailand and received her PhD from the University of Paris-X Nanterre in France.



## Tim Chao

### New Zealand

Tim Chao is a Detective Inspector with more than thirty years criminal investigation experience in roles with the National Drug Investigation Bureau, National Organised Crime Group, Intelligence, Asset Recovery, Motorcycle Gangs, Asian Crime, and general Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB).

Between 2019 and 2023 Tim was the New Zealand Police Liaison Officer appointed to Europol in The Hague. Tim is presently seconded to Immigration New Zealand as the Liaison Officer - Irregular Migration based in Jakarta.



## Tri Nuke Pudjiastuti

### Indonesia

Dr Tri Nuke Pudjiastuti is Research Professor at the Research Center for Politics, National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) and member of the ADFM Secretariat. For more than five years, she was a part of the ASEAN Research Team at BRIN. Dr Pudjiastuti's experience in trafficking and smuggling issues has also given her an insight into irregular migration. Although her research focuses on Indonesia, it also notes regional mobility, particularly at the level of ASEAN. She has also produced position and policy papers for the Indonesian government on a wide range of issues related to forced migration.



Dr Pudjiastuti graduated with a Master of Arts in Geography and Environmental Studies from the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Adelaide, with a focus on international migration. She also holds a PhD from the Department of Criminology - Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, with her dissertation focusing on people smuggling from Indonesia to Australia.

## Zconglod Khawjang

### International

Zconglod Khawjang is the Director of Displaced Persons Policy Coordination and Illegal Migration at the Ministry of Interior in Bangkok, Thailand. He has over 10 years of experience in migration governance, refugee policy, and international cooperation, focusing on forced displacement, statelessness, and labour migration issues.



Zconglod holds a Master's Degree in Migration Studies from the University of Sussex, United Kingdom.

## Organisational Profiles

### Centre for Policy Development



The Centre for Policy Development (CPD) is an independent, not-for-profit policy institute with staff in Sydney, Melbourne, Canberra and Jakarta.

CPD's vision is a fair, sustainable society and wellbeing economy that serves current and future generations in Australia and Southeast Asia.

CPD's mission is to help create transformative systems change through practical solutions to complex policy challenges. We tackle the hard questions, working towards change that is systemic and long-term.

CPD's work aims to contribute to governments that are coordinated, collaborative, and effective, with an eye to both the near and longer term. CPD strives to build a social services system that helps people and communities to thrive now and in the future, and drive shifts in policy making practice with a focus on wellbeing and sustainability rather than primarily economic growth.

CPD uses a distinctive Create-Connect-Convince method to influence government policy making. We:

1. Create ideas from rigorous, evidence-based, cross-disciplinary research at home and abroad;
2. Connect experts and stakeholders to develop these ideas into practical policy proposals;
3. Convince governments, businesses and communities to implement these proposals.

CPD's four priority areas are:

- fostering a wellbeing government in Australia,
- ensuring a just transition in Australia and Indonesia,
- driving social services reforms, and
- addressing forced migration in Southeast Asia.

These focus areas reflect CPD's commitment to addressing some of the most pressing and complex issues of our time.

### National Research and Innovation Agency



The National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) was formed by the Indonesian government in 2019, and was established as a new government agency in April 2021.

The vision for BRIN is to realise a reliable, professional, innovative National Research and Innovation Agency and to realise the President's Vision and Mission of "an advanced Indonesia that is sovereign, independent, and has personality based on mutual cooperation".

The mission of the BRIN is to:

- Provide technical and administrative support and fast, accurate and responsive analysis to the President and Vice President in conducting research, development, studies and application, as well as inventions and innovations;
- Improve the quality of human resources and infrastructure for research and innovation;
- Organise effective and efficient services in the fields of supervision, general administration, information, and institutional relations.

In addition, BRIN is also tasked with monitoring, controlling, and evaluating the performance of duties and functions of Regional Research and Innovation Agencies (BRIDA).

To achieve BRIN's vision and mission, the strategic objectives that must be achieved are:

- Improving the excellence of research and innovation in science and technology, which can be used as evidence-based policies that are in line with the direction of sustainable development.
- Improving collaboration in the development and utilisation of scientific products based on sustainable development priorities.
- Increasing productivity and competitiveness of BRIN's research and innovation resources.
- Increasing application of science and technology to support the quality of environment, disaster resilience, and climate vulnerability.
- Improving effective, efficient, and accountable governance of BRIN.

## Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University



คณะนิติศาสตร์  
FACULTY OF LAW  
Chulalongkorn University

The Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University is one of Thailand's leading institutions for legal education, with a long-standing role in legal scholarship and academic exchange. Established as a faculty in 1972, it has contributed to the development of legal education and the legal profession in Thailand.

The Faculty provides undergraduate and graduate legal education through a range of Thai and English-language programmes. These programmes cover core areas of Thai law as well as cross-cutting and specialised fields, including business and commercial law, international law, public law, criminal law, technology law, environmental law, human rights law, and transnational legal issues. This breadth allows the Faculty to engage with law not only as a professional discipline, but also as a field connected to economic development, governance, social justice, and regional and international cooperation.

The Faculty's main areas of work include:

- undergraduate and graduate legal education;
- legal scholarship and academic publication;
- seminars, workshops, public lectures, and legal knowledge-sharing activities;
- creating spaces for academic exchange among students, scholars, practitioners, public institutions, civil society, and international partners; and
- developing cooperation through joint academic activities, visiting scholars, student and staff mobility, and comparative legal study.

The Faculty works with academic institutions, public agencies, professional organisations, civil society actors, and international partners to support knowledge exchange and collaborative activities. These partnerships provide opportunities to strengthen legal education, broaden academic cooperation, and engage with legal issues affecting Thailand, Southeast Asia, and the international community.

Through its teaching, academic work, and public-facing activities, the Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University serves as a platform for legal education, scholarship, and institutional cooperation at national, regional, and international levels.

## Institute of Strategic and International Studies



The Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) was established in 1983 as an autonomous, not-for-profit research organisation. ISIS Malaysia has a diverse research focus including economics, foreign policy, security studies, nation-building, social policy, technology, innovation and environmental studies. It also undertakes research collaboration with national and international organizations in areas such as national development and international affairs.

ISIS Malaysia engages actively in Track Two diplomacy, and promotes the exchange of views and opinions at both the national and international levels. The Institute has also played a role in fostering closer regional integration and international cooperation through forums such as the Asia Pacific Roundtable, ASEAN-ISIS, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the Network of East Asian Think-Tanks (NEAT). ISIS is a founding member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and manages the Council's Secretariat.

ISIS Malaysia main research programmes comprise:

- Economics: to promote rapid and sustained economic growth and equitable development; to develop actionable policies and to spur institutional change
- Macroeconomic policy: trade, investment, banking and finance; industrial and infrastructure development; human capital and labour market development
- Foreign policy and security studies: to provide relevant policy analyses on Malaysia's strategic interests, and on regional and international issues, with a focus on the Asia Pacific; including security studies, foreign policy, Southeast Asian politics and military affairs
- Social policy: demographic and socio-cultural trends that are changing Malaysian society; effective nation-building and fostering greater national unity; Malaysian National Blueprint, youth, women and underprivileged communities
- Technology, innovation, environment and sustainability: strategic foresight, collaborative research and policy advice to the public sector, businesses and policy audiences; technology development; green growth; energy, water and food security.